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I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents
(e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is
her persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff. Her
persistent private information affects this payoff only through the lowest benefit in the support of her opponents’
prior belief. I also show that in every equilibrium which is optimal for the patient player, her on-path behavior
is nonstationary, and her long-run action frequencies are pinned down for all except two types. Conceptually,
my payoff-type approach incorporates a realistic concern that no type of reputation-building player is immune to
reneging temptations. Compared to commitment-type models, the incentive constraints for all types of patient
player lead to a sharp characterization of her highest attainable payoff and novel predictions on her behaviors.
Keywords: rational reputational types, lack-of-commitment problem, equilibrium behavior, reputation
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1 Introduction
I study people’s incentives to build reputations when the role models that they want to imitate are also strategic
and are tempted to deviate. For example, consider a seller who promises to deliver high-quality products to her
clients. After the clients agree to purchase, the seller is tempted to undercut quality on aspects that are hard to
verify. Suppose all clients know for sure that the seller faces a strictly positive cost to supply high quality but
does not know its exact magnitude, can the seller benefit from reputations for having a low cost? How does a
low-cost seller’s temptation to undercut quality affect the incentives to build and milk reputations?
To address these questions, I analyze a payoff-type reputation model in which there is no commitment type,
and all types of the reputation-building player are rational and have strict incentives to misbehave. My baseline
model features a sequential-move trust game (Figure 1, page 2) played repeatedly between a patient player 1
(e.g., a seller) and an infinite sequence of player 2s (e.g., buyers), arriving one in each period and each plays
the game only once.1 In every period, player 1 wants to win her opponents’ trust, but has a strict incentive to
∗Department of Economics, Northwestern University. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Ricardo Alonso, Guillermo Caruana, Isa Chaves,
Mehmet Ekmekci, Jeff Ely, Drew Fudenberg, Olivier Gossner, Bruno Jullien, Aditya Kuvalekar, Elliot Lipnowski, Debraj Ray, Bruno
Strulovici, Saturo Takahashi, Jean Tirole, Juuso Toikka, Tristan Tomala, Alex Wolitzky, and Muhamet Yildiz for helpful comments.
1My results are robust when players move simultaneously in the stage game, and are robust under perturbations of player 2’s discount
factor (see section 5 and Appendix D). The assumption that buyers are myopic fits into applications such as durable good markets where
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Figure 1: The stage game, where θ ∈ (0, 1), b > 0, c > 0
exert low effort once trust is granted. Her cost of exerting high effort is perfectly persistent and is her private
information, which I call her type. Every player 2 observes the outcomes of all past interactions, and prefers to
trust player 1 only when he expects high effort will be chosen with probability above some cutoff.
My analysis suggests that all types of the patient player’s temptations to misbehave introduce additional
incentive constraints, which lead to new predictions on the value of reputations as well as novel behaviorial
patterns to build and milk reputations. My results contrast to the conclusions in existing reputation models with
commitment types (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1989,1992, Benabou and Laroque 1992), given that commitment
types face no incentive constraint and mechanically play some exogenous commitment strategies.
My first result (Theorem 1) characterizes every type of patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff,2 which is
the product of her complete information Stackelberg payoff and an incomplete-information multiplier. The latter
is a sufficient statistic for the effects of incomplete information, which is strictly below one, and depends only on
the lowest possible cost in the support of player 2s’ prior belief.
By comparing every type of player 1’s highest equilibrium payoff with that in the repeated complete information
game, my result suggests that every type of player 1, except for the lowest-cost type, strictly benefits from
incomplete information. This observation is economically interesting since obtaining high payoff requires every
high-cost type to exert low effort while receiving player 2’s trust,3 and player 2’s incentive to trust suggests that
the low-cost types need to exert high effort with high enough probability. Therefore, in every period where player
1 can extract information rent, her behavior inevitably reveals information about her cost, which undermines her
future informational advantage. As her discount factor increases, the number of periods in which she needs to
extract information rent (in order to attain a given payoff) grows without bound. Conceptually, how can she reveal
information about her persistent type for unboundedly many times while preserving her informational advantage?
each buyer has unit demand, and online platforms such as Uber where a buyer is unlikely to interact with the same seller twice.
2Since players move sequentially in the stage game, the patient player’s lowest equilibrium payoff is 0. This is also the case in models
with a small probability of commitment types, and is a general feature of sequential-move stage games where future player 2s can only
observe the terminal node reached in each period, but cannot observe player 1’s (extensive-form) stage-game strategy. This motivates my
analysis of player 1’s highest equilibrium payoff instead of her lowest equilibrium payoff.
3Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990)’s result implies that if in equilibrium, a type exerts high effort with positive probability every
time she receives player 2’s trust, then her equilibrium payoff cannot exceed her highest payoff under complete information, equals 1−θ.
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My next two results examine the patient player’s behavior in her optimal equilibria. The motivation is to
understand how she builds and milks reputations to benefit from private information in the long run. Theorem 2
shows that if player 1 has two or more types, then in each of her optimal equilibrium, no type mixes between high
and low effort at every on-path history. This result extends to a type whose cost of exerting high effort is zero.
An implication is that every type of player 1 must have strict incentives at some on-path histories, even when
she is indifferent between high and low effort in the one-shot game. This conclusion contrasts to the Stackelberg
commitment types in canonical reputation models that mechanically play the same mixed action in every period.
My proof develops a single-crossing argument in repeated games, which suggests that the conclusion of
Theorem 2 hinges on the incentive constraints of all types. For a snapshot of the proof, suppose by way of
contradiction that a type who does not have the lowest cost mixes between high and low effort at every on-path
history. Then the lowest-cost type exerts high effort with probability one at every on-path history. As a result,
the second-lowest cost type separates from the lowest-cost type as soon as she exerts low effort, after which her
cost becomes the lowest one in the support of player 2s’ posterior belief, and her continuation payoff cannot
exceed that in the repeated complete information game. This contradicts Theorem 1, which suggests that the
second-lowest cost type obtains strictly higher payoff relative to complete information in her optimal equilibrium.
Next, suppose the lowest-cost type mixes at every on-path history. Then the highest-cost type exerts low
effort for sure, which implies that after observing low effort for a bounded number of periods, player 2s believe
that low effort occurs with probability close to one in all future periods, after which player 2s will stop trusting
player 1, leaving the latter a payoff close to zero. This again contradicts the optimality of equilibrium.
Theorem 3 derives bounds on player 1’s action frequencies that apply to all of her equilibrium best replies.
I show that first, if player 1’s cost is not the highest one in the support, then the relative frequency between high
and low effort cannot fall below the ratio between their probabilities in the Stackelberg action (i.e., the critical
ratio); and second, if player 1’s cost is not the lowest one in the support, then the relative frequency between
high and low effort cannot exceed the aforementioned critical ratio. The two bounds together pin down the action
frequencies for all types of the patient player, except for ones with the highest cost and the lowest cost.
The proof of Theorem 3 uses a similar single-crossing argument. A merit of my approach is that the resulting
bounds on behavior apply to all equilibrium best replies, which have stronger testable implications compared
to the ones derived in commitment-type reputation models that apply only to the patient player’s equilibrium
strategy. This distinction is economically meaningful in dynamic signaling games where information is gradually
revealed over time and the informed player’s strategy inevitably involves nontrivial mixing. This is because in
practice, researchers can usually observe a sample of the dynamic interaction, corresponding to a realized path of
a player’s actions, but not the entire distribution over her action paths, corresponding to her equilibrium strategy.
My proof of Theorem 1 is constructive, which illustrates how the patient player builds and milks reputations
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in order to maximize her benefit from persistent private information in the long run. Every equilibrium I construct
starts from an active learning phase in which player 2s trust and slowly learn about player 1’s type. Play gradually
reaches an absorbing phase after which learning stops and no type of player 1 can extract information rent.
In the active learning phase, the lowest-cost type mixes between high and low effort in every period. For
every high-cost type, if player 2’s posterior belief attaches probability close to one to the lowest-cost type, then
she exerts low effort for sure; otherwise, she plays a mixed action, with the probability of exerting high effort
being strictly lower than that of the lowest-cost type. This arrangement enables every high-cost type to rebuild her
reputation after milking it, and reduces her reputational loss when she extracts information rent. The equilibria
I construct have an appealing feature that player 1’s reputation in the active learning phase depends only on the
number of times she has exerted high and low effort in the past, but not on other more complicated metrics.
Despite every type of player 1 can flexibly choose her actions in the active learning phase, her action choices
affect the time with which play reaches the absorbing phase as well as her continuation payoff in the absorbing
phase. The constructed timing and continuation payoffs provide all types of player 1 the incentives to take their
equilibrium actions. The expected duration of the active learning phase decreases with player 1’s lowest possible
cost, increases with her patience, and increases with player 2’s propensity to trust player 1.
Related Literature: This paper contributes to the literature on reputations and rational-type repeated games.
The reputation models of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) and Gossner (2011) fix the behavior of at least
one type of patient player (i.e., commitment types), and derive payoff lower and upper bounds for a strategic-type
patient player. If the patient player’s stage-game actions are statistically identified (e.g., in simultaneous-move
stage game), and there exists a commitment type whomechanically plays a mixed action, then the strategic patient
player can attain strictly higher payoffs compared to her highest payoff in the repeated complete information
game. In addition, if there exists a commitment type who mechanically plays her Stackelberg action, then the
strategic player approximately attains her Stackelberg payoff in all equilibria, in which case the commitment-type
approach leads to a tight characterization of the patient player’s optimal equilibrium payoff. Mailath and Samuelson
(2006)’s textbook provides an excellent summary of these results. However,
1. If the patient player’s stage-game actions are not statistically identified, such as in sequential-move stage
games, then the existing results in commitment-type models do not imply what the patient player’s highest
equilibrium payoff is, nor do they imply whether the patient player can strictly benefit from incomplete
information. In the trust game example, the commitment-type reputation results only imply that the patient
player’s payoff is between her minmax payoff 0 and her Stackelberg payoff, but there is no guarantee that
this payoff upper bound is attainable, nor do these results imply whether a patient player can attain strictly
greater payoff compared to her highest payoff in the repeated complete information game.
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2. Even if the patient player’s actions are statistically identified, such as in simultaneous-move stage games
with perfect monitoring, characterizing her optimal equilibrium payoff and reaching the conclusion that
she can strictly benefit from incomplete information require the presence of commitment types who play
mixed actions. The plausibility of such types is somewhat questionable (i.e., whether they can arise from
maximizing reasonable payoff functions), and so are the reputation results that rely on such types.
3. The commitment-type approach is not well-suited to answer questions related to players’ behaviors. This
is because first, rational-type patient player’s behavior is sensitive to how the commitment types behave,
and the latter are exogenously assumed instead of endogenously derived. Second, players’ commitment
strategies do not respond to changes in the payoff environment, which include, but not limited to, the
patient player’s discount factor and her initial reputation.
I propose a complementary approach in which all types of the reputation-building player face lack-of-commitment
problems. In my payoff-type model, all types’ behaviors are endogenously determined and respond to changes
in the payoff environment. This include the most efficient type (i.e., lowest-cost type) that others want to imitate.
In terms of results, I characterize every type of patient player’s optimal equilibrium payoff as the value of a
constrained optimization problem. My characterization applies both to sequential-move and simultaneous-move
stage games. The constraints in my program unveil how the reputational type’s incentive constraints as well as
the uninformed players’ learning affect a patient player’s returns from reputation building.
My approach also answers novel questions related to the patient player’s equilibrium behavior, such as how
the reputational types behave when they also face lack-of-commitment problems, and how the other types behave
in order to exploit those rational reputational types. By exploiting the incentive constraints for all types of
the patient player, Theorems 2 and 3 derive new behavioral predictions on how a patient player builds and
milks reputations. These results have not been obtained in reputation models with commitment types. The
lowest-cost type’s equilibrium behaviors in my payoff-type model differ from the classic examples of Stackelberg
commitment types. This suggests that my results on behavior can help to evaluate which of the many commitment
strategies are more plausible in the sense that they can arise from maximizing reasonable payoff functions.
One concern is that my payoff-type approach cannot rule out low-payoff equilibria, for example, equilibria in
which all types of patient player receive their minmax payoffs. This is a disadvantage relative to commitment-type
models when players move simultaneously in the stage-game. It is not a disadvantage in sequential-move
stage-games since neither approach can rule out low-payoff equilibria, in which case the only role of reputation
is to allow the patient player to attain higher payoffs relative to complete information.
Related to this paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2016) provide a strategic foundation for nonstationary pure-strategy
commitment types in finitely repeated games using strategic types whomaximize their discounted average payoffs.
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In contrast, my paper rationalizes mixed-strategy commitment types in infinitely repeated games using strategic
types that are not only required to maximize their discounted average payoffs, but are also required to know their
own payoffs (i.e., private values), and to share the same ordinal preferences over stage-game outcomes. Caruana
and Einav (2008) endogenize players’ commitment in dynamic games using switching costs. My approach differs
from theirs since the patient player faces no direct cost to change her behavior over time.
My paper is related to the rational-type repeated game literature pioneered by Aumann and Maschler (1995).
Hart (1985) characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with one-sided private information
and no discounting. Shalev (1994) simplifies Hart’s characterization in games with private values. Pe¸ski (2014)
studies private-value repeated games with discounting and focuses on the case in which all players’ discount
factors are arbitrarily close to 1. Cripps and Thomas (2003) show that when the informed player is arbitrarily
patient and the uninformed player’s discount factor is bounded away from 1, Shalev’s characterization remains
to be a necessary condition for being an equilibrium payoff. However, it is not sufficient in general, which means
that some payoffs in that set are not attainable in equilibrium no matter how patient the informed player is.4
My Theorem 1 contributes to this literature by identifying conditions that are both necessary and sufficient
for being an equilibrium payoff. I characterize every type of patient informed player’s highest equilibrium payoff
when her opponent’s discount factor is close to or equal zero. My characterization applies to an interesting class
of games, which include but not limited to product choice games and entry deterrence games.
2 The Baseline Model
My baseline model is an infinitely repeated trust game, which highlights the lack-of-commitment problem in
economic interactions. Different from canonical reputation models with commitment types, all types of the
reputation-building player are rational and have qualitatively similar payoff functions. This captures, for instance,
all types of sellers are tempted to undercut quality but can strictly benefit from buyers’ purchases.
In section 5, I examine the robustness of my insights under variations of my baseline model, which include
simultaneous-move stage games, the uninformed player being forward-looking, and imperfect monitoring of the
informed player’s actions. Generalizations of my results beyond 2× 2 trust games are stated in Appendix D.
Stage Game: Consider the trust game in Figure 1 (on page 2) between an informed seller (player 1, she) and
an uninformed buyer (player 2, he). The buyer moves first, deciding whether to trust the seller (action T ) or not
(action N ). If he chooses N , then both players’ payoffs are normalized to 0. If he chooses T , then the seller
4An exception is zero-sum games, in which Aumann and Maschler (1995)’s characterization applies under any discount factor of the
uninformed player(s). However, the stage-game studied in this paper is not zero sum. In settings with short-lived players, the belief-free
equilibrium approach in Hörner, Lovo, and Tomala (2011) is not applicable. This is because at every history in which some types of the
patient player can extract information rent, the short-lived player’s best reply depends on his belief about the patient player’s type.
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chooses between high effort (actionH) and low effort (action L). If the seller chooses L, then her payoff is 1 and
the buyer’s payoff is −c. If the seller chooses H , then her payoff is 1− θ and the buyer’s payoff is b, where:
• b > 0 is the buyer’s benefit from the seller’s high effort, and c > 0 is the buyer’s loss from the seller’s low
effort, both of which are common knowledge among players.
• θ ∈ Θ ≡ {θ1, ...θm} ⊂ (0, 1) is the seller’s cost of high effort and is her private information. Without loss
of generality, I assume that 0 < θ1 < θ2 < ... < θm < 1. My results extend when θ1 = 0 and/or θm = 1.
The unique stage-game equilibrium outcome is N and the seller’s payoff is 0. This is because every type of
seller has a strict incentive to choose L after the buyer plays T . If the seller can optimally commit to an action
α1 ∈ ∆{H,L} before the buyer moves, then every type’s optimal commitment is to play H with probability
γ∗ ≡ c
b+c and L with probability 1− γ∗. Type θj’s optimal commitment payoff (or Stackelberg payoff ) is
v∗∗j ≡ 1− γ∗θj for every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, (2.1)
with γ∗H + (1 − γ∗)L her Stackelberg action. The above comparison between the seller’s Nash equilibrium
payoff and her Stackelberg payoff highlights a lack-of- commitment problem, which is of first order importance
not only in business transactions (Mailath and Samuelson 2001), but also in fiscal and monetary policies (Barro
1986, Phelan 2006) and political economy (Tirole 1996).
The rest of this article sets up a repeated version of this game in which all types of sellers have strict incentives
to betray. I examine the extent to which a patient seller can overcome her lack-of-commitment problem, as well
as different types of sellers’ behaviors in seller-optimal equilibria.
Repeated Game: Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... A long-lived seller interacts with an infinite
sequence of buyers, arriving one in each period and each plays the game only in the period he arrives. Both b and
c are common knowledge among players. The seller’s cost θ is perfectly persistent and is her private information.
The buyers have a full support prior belief π ∈ ∆(Θ).
Let yt ∈ {N,H,L} be the stage-game outcome in period t, in which H stands for the buyer chooses T and
the seller chooses H , and L stands for the buyer chooses T and the seller chooses L. Let ht = {ys}t−1s=0 ∈ Ht
be a public history with H ≡ ⋃+∞t=0 Ht the set of public histories.5 Let A1 ≡ {H,L} and A2 ≡ {T,N}. Let
σ2 : H → ∆(A2) be the buyers’ strategy. Let σ1 ≡ (σθ)θ∈Θ, with type θ seller’s strategy being σθ : H → ∆(A1),
which specifies this type of seller’s action choices at every public history conditional on the buyer choosing T .
5There is no public randomization device in my baseline model. My results apply as long as future buyers cannot perfectly monitor
the seller’s mixed actions, which is a standard assumption in the repeated game and reputation literature. This is satisfied in my baseline
model, repeated simultaneous-move games with and without public randomizations, and repeated sequential-move games in which
the public randomization is realized before player 2 moves or after player 1 moves. This assumption is violated when players move
sequentially in the stage-game and the public randomization is realized in between player 2’s and player 1’s moves.
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The seller’s stage-game payoff is denoted by u1(θ, yt), which depends on her type θ and the stage-game
outcome yt ∈ {N,H,L}. The seller’s discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1). Type θ seller chooses σθ in order to
maximize:
E
(σθ ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(θ, yt)
]
, (2.2)
with E(σθ ,σ2)[·] the expectation overH under the probability measure induced by (σθ, σ2).
3 Results
Theorem 1 characterizes every type of patient seller’s highest equilibrium payoff. Theorem 2 shows that no type
of seller uses stationary strategies or completely mixed strategies in any seller-optimal equilibrium. Theorem 3
derives bounds on the seller’s action frequencies that apply to all of her equilibrium best replies. These novel
predictions rely on all types of seller’s incentive constraints, i.e., their incentives to betray and to receive trust.
These are not obtained in commitment-type models since commitment types face no incentive constraints.
3.1 Patient Player’s Optimal Equilibrium Payoff
Since there arem types, the seller’s payoff is an m-dimensional vector v ≡ (v1, ..., vm) ∈ Rm, in which the jth
entry of v represents the discounted average payoff of type θj . Let v
∗ ≡ (v∗1 , ..., v∗m), with:
v∗j ≡ (1− γ∗θj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type θj ’s Stackelberg payoff
1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
incomplete-information multiplier
, for every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}. (3.1)
Theorem 1. If π has full support, then for every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1),
1. There exists no Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) in which type θ1’s payoff is strictly more than v
∗
1 .
There exists no BNE in which type θj’s payoff is more than v
∗
j + ε for some j ∈ {2, ...,m}.
2. There exists a sequential equilibrium in which the seller’s payoff is within ε of v∗.6
The proof is in Appendix A and B. According to Theorem 1, v∗j is type θj patient seller’s highest equilibrium
payoff, and the highest equilibrium payoffs for all types can be (approximately) attained in the same equilibrium.
I use different solution concepts in the two statements of Theorem 1 to strengthen my result. In particular, the
necessary conditions for being an equilibrium payoff applies under a weak solution concept (BNE), and the
equilibrium that attains v∗ can survive demanding refinements such as sequential equilibrium.
6The notion of sequential equilibrium in this infinitely repeated game is introduced by Pe¸ski (2014).
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Payoff of Type θ1
Payoff of Type θ2
(1− θ1, 1− θ2)
(1, 1)
(1− γ∗θ1, 1− γ∗θ2)
v∗
Figure 2: Whenm = 2, player 1’s highest equilibrium payoff v∗ in red and her equilibrium payoff set in yellow.
Equation (3.1) provides a tractable formula for type θj seller’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is the
product of her complete information Stackelberg payoff and an incomplete information multiplier. This multiplier
is strictly below 1 and is common for all types. Interestingly, it depends only on the lowest possible cost in the
support of buyers’ prior belief, but not on the other types in the support and the probability of each type.
To understand the intuition behind formula (3.1), I state a lemma which relates v∗j to the value of a constrained
optimization problem, with proof in Appendix B.3:
Lemma 3.1. For every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, the value of the following constrained optimization problem is v∗j :
max
α∈∆{N,H,L}
{
(1− θj) α(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of outcome H
+ α(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of outcome L
}
, (3.2)
subject to:
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L) ≤ 1− θ1, (3.3)
and
α(H) ≥ γ
∗
1− γ∗α(L). (3.4)
Next, I map the choice variable in the optimization problem α into the repeated incomplete information game.
For given Bayes Nash equilibrium σ ≡ ((σθ)θ∈Θ, σ2), type θj’s equilibrium payoff in the repeated game equals
her expected payoff in a one-shot interaction under outcome distribution αj ∈ ∆{N,H,L}, where
αj(y) ≡ E(σθj ,σ2)[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = y}
]
, for every y ∈ {N,H,L}.
Replacing α with αj , the objective function (3.2) is type θj’s equilibrium payoff in the repeated game. According
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to Lemma 3.1, the necessity of constraints (3.3) and (3.4) implies that type θj’s equilibrium payoff cannot exceed
v∗j . I explain intuitively why constraints (3.3) and (3.4) are necessary for α
j , with formal proofs in Appendix B.
Constraint (3.3) requires that by adopting the equilibrium strategy of type θj , type θ1 cannot receive payoff
strictly higher than 1− θ1, the latter is type θ1’s highest equilibrium payoff when her type is common knowledge
(Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin 1990). In Appendix B.1, I show by induction on the number of types that type
θ1’s payoff cannot exceed 1 − θ1. Intuitively, type θ1 is the most efficient type, she has no good candidate to
imitate, so she cannot strictly benefit from incomplete information. The distribution αj needs to satisfy constraint
(3.3) since in equilibrium, type θ1 cannot receive strictly higher payoff by deviating to the strategy of type θj .
Such a constraint is missing in commitment-type models since commitment types face no incentive constraints.
Constraint (3.4) arises from buyers’ incentive constraints and their learning. This is because first, in all except
for a bounded number of periods, buyers’ predictions about the seller’s actions are arbitrarily close to the latter’s
equilibrium actions (according to the seller’s true type). Second, a buyer has no incentive to play T at ht unless
he expects H to be played at ht with probability at least γ∗. The two parts together imply that for every ε > 0,
there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that in every equilibrium where δ > δ,
αj(H)
αj(L)
=
E
(σθj ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E
(σθj ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ≥ γ∗ − ε
1− γ∗ + ε , for every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}.
The necessity of constraint (3.4) is obtained by sending ε to 0.
After understanding the necessity of these constraints, the challenging step is to establish their sufficiency,
i.e., there exist equilibria that approximately attain v∗. This is somewhat puzzling since for every j ≥ 2, type
θj needs to extract information rent (i.e., playing L for sure in periods where the buyer plays T ) for unbounded
number of periods to receive discounted average payoff strictly greater than 1 − θj . For this to be incentive
compatible from the buyers’ perspective, other types of the seller need to play H with high enough probability.
As a result, a type that extracts information rent inevitably reveals information about her type. This undermines
her ability to extract information rent in the future since her informational advantage deteriorates every time she
receives high stage-game payoff. In section 4.1, I explain how to construct equilibrium in which every high-cost
type can extract information rent for unboundedly many times while preserving her informational advantage.
Theorem 1 has three implications. First, aside from the lowest-cost type θ1, every type can strictly benefit
from incomplete information, i.e., for every j ≥ 2, type θj’s highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated incomplete
information game v∗j is strictly greater than her highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete information
game 1− θj . Second, the multiplier term converges to 1 as θ1 vanishes to 0, and every type’s highest equilibrium
payoff converges to her Stackelberg payoff. This suggests that although no type of seller is immune to reneging
temptations, every type of patient seller can approximately attain her optimal commitment payoff.
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Corollary 1. For every ε > 0, there exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and θ1 > 0 such that when δ > δ and θ1 < θ1, there
exists a sequential equilibrium in which type θj’s equilibrium payoff is no less than v
∗∗
j −ε for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Third, the lowest-cost type seller fully reveals her private information for unboundedly many times in every
equilibrium that is approximately optimal for the seller. Formally, let H(σθ ,σ2) be the set of histories that occur
with positive probability under (σθ, σ2). A subset of histories H′ is called an independent set if no pair of
elements inH′ can be ranked via the predecessor-successor relationship. The result is stated as Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. For every N ∈ N and v = (v1, ..., vm) such that vj > 1 − θj for every j ∈ {2, ...,m}, there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that in every BNE that attains v when δ > δ, there exists an independent set H′ with
|H′| > N and H′ ⊂ H(σθ1 ,σ2), such that player 2’s belief attaches probability 1 to type θ1 for every ht ∈ H′.
This is because for each high-cost type, there exists a pure strategy in the support of her equilibrium strategy
according to which her stage-game payoff exceeds 1−θ only at histories where her equilibrium strategy prescribes
L and player 2 plays T . Doing so requires the lowest-cost type to play H with positive probability, after which
she fully reveals her private information.
3.2 Patient Player’s Behavior in High-Payoff Equilibria
I focus on settings in which the seller has at least two types, i.e.,m ≥ 2. I derive properties of the patient seller’s
on-path behaviors that apply to all equilibria that approximately attain her highest equilibrium payoff v∗ ∈ Rm.
First, I show that no matter how low the cost of playing H is, no type of patient seller has completely mixed
equilibrium best replies, and moreover, every type’s equilibrium strategy exhibits nontrivial history dependence.
For every σ ≡ ({σθ}θ∈Θ, σ2), I say σθ is stationary (with respect to σ) if it prescribes the same action at
every history that occurs with positive probability under (σθ, σ2); I say σθ is completely mixed (with respect to
σ) if it prescribes a nontrivially mixed action at every history that occurs with positive probability under (σθ, σ2).
Theorem 2. When m ≥ 2, for every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that when δ > δ, no
type of player 1 uses stationary strategies or completely mixed strategies in any BNE that attains payoff within ε
of v∗. Moreover, no type has a completely mixed best reply in any such BNE.7
As will become clear later in the proof, the conclusion of Theorem 2 applies more broadly. For example,
it extends to simultaneous-move stage games, as well as to a type whose cost of exerting high effort equals 0,
i.e., θ1 = 0. It suggests that in every seller-optimal equilibrium, every type has strict incentives at some on-path
histories. This is the case even when she is indifferent between exerting high and low effort in the one-shot game.
7Neither m ≥ 2 nor the seller attains payoff approximately v∗ is redundant for the conclusion of Theorem 2. Counterexamples are
available upon request.
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The conclusion of Theorem 2 contrasts to the Stackelberg commitment types in Fudenberg and Levine (1992)
and Gossner (2011), who mechanically play the same mixed action in every period. To further strengthen
the motivation for excluding such types in my model, I allow player 1 to have arbitrary stage-game payoff
functions in Appendix C.2. I show that if a type plays a nontrivially mixed action at every on-path history,
then she must be indifferent across all outcomes in the one-shot game (Proposition C.1). In the buyer-seller
application, it translates into a type of seller who faces zero cost of supplying high quality, and receives zero
benefit from buyers’ purchases. Therefore, the stationary Stackelberg behavior can arise in equilibrium only
under a knife-edge stage-game payoff function.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose toward a contradiction that type θj’s best reply is to mix at every on-path history.
Then both playing L at every on-path history and playing H at every on-path history are her best replies against
σ2. Since types with lower costs enjoy comparative advantages in playing H and vice versa, every type with cost
higher than θj plays L with probability 1 at every on-path history, and every type with cost lower than θj plays
H with probability 1 at every on-path history.8
In what follows, I show by contradiction that none of these pure stationary strategies are compatible with the
requirement that type θj’s payoff is strictly above 1− θj for every j ≥ 2.
First, suppose there exists a type θk that plays L with probability 1 at every on-path history. According to
Fudenberg and Levine (1989), if the seller is of type θk, then the buyers will eventually believe that L will be
played with probability greater than 1 − γ∗ in all future periods, after which they will have a strict incentive to
play N . This implies that type θk seller’s discounted average payoff is close to 0 when δ is close to 1.
Next, suppose j ≥ 2 and types θ1 to θj−1 play H with probability 1 at every on-path history. Then after type
θj plays L for one period, she becomes the lowest-cost type in the support of buyers’ posterior belief. I show in
Proposition B.1 of Appendix B that type θj’s payoff in the continuation game is at most 1 − θj , and therefore,
her discounted average payoff cannot exceed (1− δ)+ δ(1− θj ). The latter is strictly lower than v∗j when δ → 1
given that v∗j > 1− θj for every j ≥ 2.
The next step is to rule out stationary strategies. Stationary (non-trivially) mixed strategies have been ruled
out since I have shown that no type of seller plays completely mixed strategies in equilibrium. Stationary pure
strategies have been ruled out by the above proof given that it has established that neither playing H for sure at
every on-path history and playing L for sure at every on-path history can be equilibrium strategies of any type of
the patient seller in equilibria that approximately attains v∗.
Focusing on seller-optimal equilibria, my next result derives lower and upper bounds on the seller’s action
8If we order the states and actions according to T ≻ N , H ≻ L and θ1 ≻ θ2 ≻ ... ≻ θm, then the stage-game payoff satisfies a
monotone-supermodularity condition in Liu and Pei (2020). This is sufficient to guarantee the monotonicity of the sender’s strategy with
respect to her type in one-shot signalling games. I use an implication of their result on repeated signalling games (Pei 2019).
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frequencies that apply not only to all of her equilibrium strategies, but also to all of her equilibrium best replies.
Theorem 3. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for every δ > δ, in every BNE
σ ≡ ((σθ)θ∈Θ, σ2) that attains payoff within ε of v∗,
1. For every θ 6= θm and for every best reply σ̂θ of type θ’s against σ2:
E
(σ̂θ ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1 − δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ≥ γ∗ − ε
1− (γ∗ − ε) . (3.5)
2. For every θ 6= θ1 and for every best reply σ̂θ of type θ’s against σ2:
E
(σ̂θ ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1 − δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ≤ γ∗ + ε
1− (γ∗ + ε) . (3.6)
The proof is in Appendix C.1. The two bounds in Theorem 3 pin down the action frequencies for all types of
sellers except for the lowest-cost and the highest-cost types. Since type θj’s payoff is approximately v
∗
j , it also
pins down the discounted average frequency of every stage-game outcome under every equilibrium best reply:
Corollary 3. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ > δ, in every BNE
σ ≡ ((σθ)θ∈Θ, σ2) that attains payoff within ε of v∗, for every σ̂θ that is type θ ∈ {θ2, ..., θm−1}’s best reply
against σ2, we have:
E
(σ̂θ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
] ∈ (γ∗ 1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 − ε, γ
∗ 1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 + ε
)
, (3.7)
E
(σ̂θ ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ∈ ((1− γ∗) 1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 − ε, (1− γ
∗)
1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 + ε
)
, (3.8)
and
E
(σ̂θ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = N}
] ∈ ((1− γ∗)θ1
1− γ∗θ1 − ε,
(1− γ∗)θ1
1− γ∗θ1 + ε
)
. (3.9)
Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 differ from the following implication of Fudenberg and Levine (1992)’s result,
that according to every type of seller’s equilibrium strategy, the ratio between the discounted average frequency
of outcome H and the discounted average frequency of outcome L is no less than γ∗/(1 − γ∗).
The reason is that Fudenberg and Levine (1992)’s result only applies to the seller’s equilibrium strategies,
while the bounds in Theorem 3 apply to all of her equilibrium best replies, which include but not limited to her
equilibrium strategies. As an illustrative example, the strategy of playing the Stackelberg action at every on-path
history satisfies the requirement in Fudenberg and Levine (1992), but has been ruled out by Theorem 3. This is
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Payoff of Type θ1
Payoff of Type θ2
(1, 1)
(1− γ∗θ1, 1− γ∗θ2)
v(γ)
v∗
(1− θ1, 1− θ2)
Figure 3: In an example with two types, the set of attainable payoffs in yellow and v(γ) in blue.
because for some pure strategies in the support of the seller’s equilibrium strategy (such as playing L at every
history), the relative frequency of outcome L exceeds (3.5). For other pure strategies in its support (such as
playing H at every history), the relative frequency of outcome L falls below (3.6).
Conceptually, the bounds that apply to all equilibrium best replies have stronger testable implications compared
to the ones that apply only to equilibrium strategies. This distinction is economically important given that in many
markets, researchers can only observe one or a few realized paths of the game’s outcomes instead of an entire
distribution over outcome paths. The predictions of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 apply to every pure-strategy best
reply, and therefore, can be tested by observing a realized path of equilibrium play. For example, Corollary 3
implies that the frequencies of outcome H and outcome L are strictly decreasing in θ1, and the frequency of
outcome N is strictly increasing in θ1. By observing the frequencies of outcomes along a realized path of play,
a researcher can identify whether there are more efficient types under the buyers’ belief, and if yes, he can infer
the value of θ1 based on his estimation of γ
∗ and the observed frequencies of different outcomes.
4 Constructing High-Payoff Equilibria
Let vN ≡ (0, 0, ..., 0), vH ≡ (1 − θ1, 1 − θ2, ..., 1 − θm), and vL ≡ (1, 1, ..., 1), which are the seller’s payoffs
from outcomes N ,H , and L, respectively. For every γ ∈ [γ∗, 1], let
v(γ) ≡ θ1(1− γ)
1− γθ1 v
N +
(1− θ1)γ
1− γθ1 v
H +
(1− θ1)(1 − γ)
1− γθ1 v
L ∈ Rm. (4.1)
I depict v(γ) in Figure 3. One can verify that v(·) is a continuous function of γ with v(γ∗) = v∗ and v(1) = vH .
Statement 2 of Theorem 1 is implied by Proposition 4.1, which is shown in Appendix A:
Proposition 4.1. For every η ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (γ∗, 1), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that when δ > δ and the
prior belief π attaches probability more than η to type θ1, there exists equilibrium that attains v(γ).
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In section 4.1, I provide an overview of the equilibrium construction in an environment with two types.
In section 4.2, I summarize the main ideas behind the construction and discuss the key features of players’
equilibrium strategies. In section 4.3, I compare the equilibrium dynamics with other reputation models.
4.1 Equilibrium Construction with Two Types: Strategies and Continuation Values
I specify players’ actions and the evolution of player 1’s continuation value at on-path histories. At every off-path
history, player 2 plays N , and all types of player 1 play L if player 2 plays T . I keep track of two state variables:
1. η(ht) ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability of type θ1 under player 2’s belief at ht, and is called player 1’s
reputation, with η(h0) equals the prior probability of type θ1.
2. v(ht) ∈ R2, which is P1’s continuation value at ht, with v(h0) ≡ v(γ). I verify in Appendix A.4.1 that
for every ht, v(ht) is a convex combination of vN , vH and vL, i.e., v(ht) = pN (ht)vN + pH(ht)vH +
pL(ht)vL. Hence, keeping track of v(ht) is equivalent to keeping track of pN (ht), pH(ht), and pL(ht).
I partition the set of histories into three classes, depending on the value of pL(ht):
• Class 1 Histories: pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ.
• Class 2 Histories: pL(ht) ∈ (0, 1 − δ).
• Class 3 Histories: pL(ht) = 0.
Play starts from a Class 1 history, and reaches a Class 3 history in finite time, after which it stays there forever.
Active learning about player 1’s type happens at Class 1 and Class 2 histories (i.e., call it an active learning
phase), but stops at Class 3 histories (i.e., call it an absorbing phase).
Class 1 Histories: Play starts from a Class 1 history where pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ. If ht belongs to Class 1, then
• Player 2 plays T for sure.
• Player 2’s posterior beliefs, η(ht,H) and η(ht, L), are functions of η(ht):
η(ht,H) = η∗ +min
{
1− η∗, (1 + λ(1− γ∗))(η(ht)− η∗)}, (4.2)
and η(ht, L) = η∗ + (1− λγ∗)(η(ht)− η∗). (4.3)
– η∗ ∈ (γ∗η(h0), η(h0)) is a constant. Given that η(h0) > η∗, one can verify by induction that
η(ht) > η∗ for every Class 1 (and Class 2) history ht.
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– λ > 0 is a constant that measures the speed of player 2’s learning. I require
(
1− λγ∗)1−γ(1 + λ(1− γ∗))γ > 1. (4.4)
Since γ > γ∗, Taylor’s theorem implies that (4.4) is satisfied when λ is sufficiently small.
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) pin down both types of player 1’s actions at ht. This is because according to Bayes
Rule, the probability with which type θ1 plays H at h
t is:
η(ht)− η(ht, L)
η(ht,H)− η(ht, L) ·
η(ht,H)
η(ht)
, (4.5)
and the probability with which type θ2 plays H at h
t is:
η(ht)− η(ht, L)
η(ht,H)− η(ht, L) ·
1− η(ht,H)
1− η(ht) . (4.6)
Plugging (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.5) and (4.6), every type’s action at ht can be written as a function of η(ht).
Let pH(h
t) be the probability of H being played at ht according to player 2’s belief at ht. Since player 2’s
belief is a martingale, pH(h
t)η(ht,H) + (1 − pH(ht))η(ht, L) = η(ht). Equation (4.3) and η(ht) > η∗ imply
that η(ht, L) 6= η(ht). This together with the martingale condition implies that:
1− pH(ht)
pH(ht)
=
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
η(ht)− η(ht, L) .
Plugging (4.2) and (4.3) into the above equation, we have:
1− pH(ht)
pH(ht)
=
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
η(ht)− η(ht, L) ≤
1− γ∗
γ∗
. (4.7)
This implies that pH(h
t) ≥ γ∗, which suggests that player 2 has an incentive to play T at ht.
Player 1’s continuation value after playing L at ht is:
v(ht, L) =
pN (ht)
δ
vN +
pL(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vL +
pH(ht)
δ
vH . (4.8)
If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, then player 1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is given by:
v(ht,H) =
pN (ht)
δ
vN +
pL(ht)
δ
vL +
pH(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vH . (4.9)
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If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then player 1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is given by:
v(ht,H) =
v1(h
t,H)
1− θ1 v
H +
(
1− v1(h
t,H)
1− θ1
)
vN , (4.10)
with v1(h
t,H) ≡ v1(h
t)− (1− δ)(1 − θ1)
δ
and v1(h
t) is the first entry of v(ht). (4.11)
If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, then (4.8) and (4.9) imply that both types of player 1 are indifferent between H
and L. If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then (4.8), (4.10) and (4.11) imply that type θ1 is indifferent while type
θ2 strictly prefers L. Player 1’s incentive constraints at h
t are satisfied since when η(ht,H) < 1, both types are
required to mix; and when η(ht,H) = 1, type θ1 is required to mix while type θ2 plays L for sure.
Class 2 Histories: At every Class 2 history ht, i.e., one in which pL(ht) ∈ (0, 1− δ),
• Player 2 plays T for sure.
• Type θ1 plays H for sure. Type θ2 plays L with probability min{1, 1−γ
∗
1−η(ht)}. Therefore, the probability
with which L being played at ht is (1−η(ht))min{1, 1−γ∗1−η(ht)}, which is no more than 1−γ∗. This implies
that player 2 has an incentive to play T .
After player 1 plays L at ht, η(ht, L) = 0 given that type θ1 plays H for sure, and player 1’s continuation value
is given by:
v
(
ht, L
) ≡ Q(ht)
δ
vH +
δ −Q(ht)
δ
vN , (4.12)
where
Q(ht) ≡ pH(ht)− 1− δ − p
L(ht)
1− θ2 (4.13)
Player 1’s continuation value after playing H depends on whether η(ht,H) equals 1 or not, the latter can be
computed according to Bayes Rule via η(ht) and different types’ mixing probabilities specified above.
1. If η(ht,H) < 1, then player 1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is given by (4.9).
2. If η(ht,H) = 1, then player 1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is given by (4.10).
If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, then (4.12) and (4.9) imply that type θ2 is indifferent and type θ1 strictly prefers
to playH . If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then (4.12) and (4.10) imply that type θ2 strictly prefers to play L and
type θ1 strictly prefers to play H . Player 1’s incentive constraints at h
t are satisfied since type θ1 is required to
play H , while type θ2 is required to mix only if η(h
t,H) < 1, and is required to play L if η(ht,H) = 1.
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Class 3 Histories: If ht is such that pL(ht) = 0, then all types of player 1 play the same action at ht so learning
about her type stops. Moreover, her continuation value at every subsequent history is also a convex combination
of vH and vN , i.e., all subsequent histories belong to Class 3. The construction of equilibrium play after reaching
any Class 3 history uses Lemma 3.7.2 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006, page 99):
Lemma 3.7.2 in MS (2006). For all ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1) and every
v ∈ Rm that is a convex combination of v(1), v(2),...,v(k), there exists {vs}∞s=0 with vs ∈ {v(1), ..., v(k)} such
that (1) v =
∑∞
s=0(1− δ)δsvs, and (2) for every l ∈ N,
∑∞
s=l(1− δ)δs−lvs is within ε of v.
Since v(ht) is a convex combination of vH and vN , the above lemma implies that when δ is above some
cutoff, there exists an infinite sequence {vs}∞t=0 with vs ∈ {vN , vH} such that:
1. v(ht) = (1− δ)∑∞s=0 δsvs,
2. For every l ∈ N, (1− δ)∑∞s=l δs−lvs is within ε of v(ht).
The continuation play following ht is:
• For every s ∈ N such that vs = vH , P2 plays T and all types of P1 play H in period t+ s.
• For every s ∈ N such that vs = vN , P2 plays N and all types of P1 play L in period t+ s.
Player 2’s incentive constraints at Class 3 histories are trivially satisfied. To verify player 1’s incentive constraints,
I show in Lemma A.5 of Appendix A that pH(ht) is bounded from below by some strictly positive number for
every ht belonging to Class 1 or Class 2. This implies that if ht belongs to Class 3 but none of its predecessors
belong to Class 3, then pH(ht) is also bounded from below by a positive number. Pick ε in the above lemma
to be small enough, one can ensure that player 1’s continuation value at every on-path history succeeding ht is
strictly bounded away from 0. This implies that at every on-path history where player 1 is asked to play H , all
types of patient player 1 have strict incentives to comply. This is because every type’s continuation payoff equals
0 if she does not comply, and her continuation payoff is strictly bounded away from 0 if she complies.
Promise Keeping: I have verified player 2s’ incentive constraints, and have constructed continuation values
under which player 1’s incentive constraints are satisfied. What remains to be verified is the promise keeping
constraint, that the continuation play at every on-path history delivers all types of player 1 their respective
continuation values. This is established by showing that under the above strategy profile, play reaches a Class
3 history in finite time with probability 1 (implied by Lemmas A.1 and A.4 in Appendix A),9 and player 1’s
continuation value at Class 3 histories can be delivered via a sequence of payoffs consisting only of vH and vN .
9Nevertheless, the expected duration of the active learning phase (Class 1 and 2 histories) grows without bound as δ approaches 1.
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Remark: For illustration, I verify the conclusions of Theorems 2 and 3 in the constructed equilibrium. For
Theorem 2, type θ1 mixes at Class 1 histories but has strict incentives at Class 2 and Class 3 histories; type
θ2 mixes in the active learning phase when her reputation is low, but has a strict incentive to play L when her
reputation is high. She also has a strict incentive in the absorbing phase. Verifying the conclusion of Theorem 3
requires a careful examination of player 1’s continuation values, in particular, the convex weights of vH , vN and
vL. These three state variables keep track of the discounted average frequency of each stage-game outcome that
has occurred before. In the constructed equilibrium that attains v(γ),
• Consider the discounted frequency of outcomes when type θ1 plays one of her pure-strategy best replies. If
the posterior belief η(ht) never reaches 1, then the discounted average frequency of outcome H is γ 1−θ11−γθ1 ,
the discounted average frequency of outcome L is (1− γ) 1−θ11−γθ1 . If the posterior belief η(ht) reaches 1 for
some t ∈ N, then the discounted average frequency of outcome H is strictly higher than γ 1−θ11−γθ1 , and the
discounted average frequency of outcome L is strictly lower than (1− γ) 1−θ11−γθ1 .
• Consider the discounted frequency of outcomes when type θ2 plays one of her pure-strategy best replies. If
play was at a Class 1 history in the period before entering the absorbing phase, then the discounted average
frequency of outcome H is γ 1−θ11−γθ1 , the discounted average frequency of outcome L is (1 − γ)
1−θ1
1−γθ1 . If
play was at a Class 2 history in the period before entering the absorbing phase, then the discounted average
frequency of outcome H is strictly lower than γ 1−θ11−γθ1 , and the discounted average frequency of outcome
L is strictly higher than (1− γ) 1−θ11−γθ1 .
The conclusion of Theorem 3 is verified once taking γ to be arbitrarily close to γ∗.
4.2 Summary of Ideas Behind the Construction
To start with, learning about player 1’s type is indispensable for her to attain payoff v∗, or anything above vH .
According to Corollary 2, player 1 needs to be able to rebuild her reputation after playing L.10 This is because
otherwise, she cannot extract information rent for unboundedly many periods and as a result, cannot obtain
discounted average payoff significantly above 1− θ. To make reputation rebuilding feasible, both types of player
1 mix between H and L, except for histories where η(ht) is close to 1, in which case the low-cost type θ1 mixes
betweenH and L while the high-cost type θ2 plays L for sure. Intuitively, this arrangement reduces the high-cost
type’s reputation loss when she shirks for sure and extracts information rent.11
10This is true except for histories such that pL(ht) ≤ 1− δ, which happens only if L has been played too frequently before.
11Histories at which type θ2 has a strict incentive to play L is indispensable for her to attain payoff v
∗
2 . This is because otherwise,
playing H at every history where T is played with positive probability is one of type θ2’s equilibrium best reply, and under this strategy
of hers, her payoff in every period cannot exceed 1− θ2, which is strictly lower than v
∗
2 .
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The presence of the absorbing phase (Class 3 histories) is to provide all types of player 1 the incentives to mix
in the active learning phase (Class 1 & 2 histories). Despite player 1 can flexibly choose her actions when active
learning takes place, her action choices affect her continuation payoff after reaching the absorbing phase, as well
as the calendar time at which play enters the absorbing phase. For example, if player 1 plays L too frequently
in the beginning, then pL(ht) decreases more quickly and play reaches a Class 3 history as soon as pL(ht) = 0,
after which player 1’s continuation value is low and can no longer extract information rent.
A more subtle situation occurs when player 1 plays H too frequently, which decreases pH(ht) and increases
pL(ht). It raises a concern that pH(ht)/pL(ht) may fall below γ
∗
1−γ∗ , after which player 1’s continuation payoff
cannot be delivered in any equilibrium. To address this, play enters the absorbing phase when η(ht) reaches 1,
after which the continuation play consists only of outcomesN andH . Type θ1 is indifferent between entering the
absorbing phase (by playing H) and remaining in the active learning phase (by playing L), while type θ2 strictly
prefers the latter option. This is because type θ1 has a comparative advantage in playing H . Requirement (4.4)
on λ implies that given pH(h0)/pL(h0) is strictly greater than γ
∗
1−γ∗ and play remains in the active learning phase
at ht, the ratio of the convex weights pH(ht)/pL(ht) is also strictly greater than γ
∗
1−γ∗ . This is formally stated as
Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, which ensures that the equilibrium play eventually reaches a Class 3 history.
What needs to be considered next is the speed of learning λ. In order to maximize player 1’s equilibrium
payoff, one needs to maximize the frequency of outcome L while simultaneously providing incentives for player
2s to trust. This leads to the role of slow learning, i.e., λ being low. To understand why, first, player 2’s incentive
to trust translates into an upper bound on the relative rate of learning, given by (4.7). In a nutshell, it requires
that the magnitude of reputation improvement after playing H to be small enough relative to the magnitude of
reputation deterioration after playing L. Second, fixing the relative rate of learning and the long-run frequencies
of outcomes H and L, the amount of reputation loss per period vanishes as the absolute speed of learning goes
to zero. As a result, lowering the absolute speed of learning improves player 1’s long-term reputation without
compromising on player 2s’ willingness to trust. This allows for an increase in the long-run frequency of outcome
L without sacrificing player 1’s reputation, which helps to improve player 1’s payoff.
4.3 Comparing Equilibrium Dynamics
I compare the equilibrium dynamics in mymodel to those in models with behavioral biases (Jehiel and Samuelson
2012), reputation cycles (Sobel 1985, Phelan 2006, Liu 2011, Liu and Skryzpacz 2014), gradual learning (Benabou
and Laroque 1992, Wiseman 2005, 2012, Ekmekci 2011), mixed-strategy commitment types (Mathevet, Pearce
and Stacchetti 2019), capital-theoretic models of reputations (Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn 2013, Bohren 2018,
Dilmé 2018), and models of reputation sustainability (Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson 2004).
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Analogical-Based Reasoning Equilibria: The patient player alternates between her actions to manipulate her
opponents’ belief is reminiscent of the analogy-based reasoning equilibria in Jehiel and Samuelson (2012). In
their model, there are multiple commitment types who are playing stationary mixed strategies, and one strategic
type who can flexibly choose her actions. The short-run players mistakenly believe that the strategic type is
playing a stationary strategy. In the trust game, their results imply that the strategic long-run player’s behavior
experiences a reputation building phase in which she plays H for a bounded number of periods, followed by
a reputation manipulation phase that resembles the active learning phase in my model where she alternates
between H and L according to the Stackelberg frequencies. The short-run players’ posterior belief fluctuates
within a small neighborhood of the cutoff belief, implying that the long-run player’s type is never fully revealed.
Comparing my model to theirs, there are two qualitative differences in the reputation dynamics that highlight
the distinctions between rational and analogical-based short-run players. First, learning stops in finite time in
my model while it lasts forever in theirs. This is driven by the constraint that type θ1’s equilibrium payoff
cannot exceed 1 − θ1, which comes from the rational short-run players’ ability to correctly predict the long-run
player’s average action in every period. This constraint is absent when short-run players use analogy-based
reasoning since they can only correctly predict the long-run player’s average action across all periods. Second,
the short-run players learn the true state with positive probability in every high-payoff equilibrium of my model,
while in Jehiel and Samuelson (2012), the probability with which they learn the true state is zero. This is because
analogy-based short-run players’ posterior beliefs depend only on the empirical frequencies of the observed
actions. That is to say, their beliefs are not responsive enough to each individual observation.
Reputation Building-Milking Cycles: The behavioral pattern that a patient player builds her reputation in
order to milk it in the future has been identified in commitment-type models with either changing types (Phelan
2006), or limited memories (Liu 2011, Liu and Skrzypacz 2014). In terms of differences, first, the reputation
cycles in Phelan (2006), Liu (2011) and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) can last forever while learning stops in finite
time in mine. This is driven by the constraint that the lowest-cost type’s equilibrium payoff cannot exceed 1−θ1,
which arises because this type is rational and has strict incentives to misbehave.
Second, reputations are built and milked gradually in my model while in theirs, the agent’s reputation falls
to its lower bound every time she milks it. This is because the commitment types in their models never betray.
As a result, one misbehavior reveals the long-run player’s rationality. In my model, the behaviors of good and
bad types are close since all types share the same ordinal preferences over stage-game outcomes and face strict
temptations to misbehave. In the long-run player’s optimal equilibrium, the lowest-cost type misbehaves with
positive probability for unbounded number of periods, which does not reduce her own payoff while at the same
time, covering up for the other types when they milk reputations.
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This feature of gradual learning is supported empirically by several studies of online markets. As documented
in Dellarocas (2006) and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), consumers judge the quality of sellers based on their
reputation scores, which are usually obtained via averaging the ratings they obtained in the past. Empirical works
have documented that one recent negative rating neither significantly affects the amount of sales nor the prices of
a reputable seller who has obtained many positive ratings in the past, which matches the dynamics in my model.
ReputationModels with Gradual Learning: Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Ekmekci (2011) study reputation
games with commitment types and the long-run player’s actions are imperfectly monitored. In their equilibria,
learning also happens gradually since the short-run players cannot tell the difference between intended cheating
and exogenous noise. In contrast, mymodel has perfect monitoring of stage-game outcomes but has no commitment
type. Gradual learning occurs since the reputational type cheats with positive probability. The different driving
forces behind gradual learning also lead to different long-run outcomes. In mymodel, reputation building-milking
cycles stop in finite time while in theirs, reputation cycles last forever. As mentioned before, this is driven by
the rational reputational type’s strict incentive to misbehave, which implies an upper bound on her equilibrium
payoff. Another difference is that the short-run players never fully learn the long-run player’s type in Benabou
and Laroque (1992) and Ekmekci (2011), while in mine, the lowest-cost type fully reveals her private information
for unboundedly many times in every high-payoff equilibrium (Corollary 2).
The class of equilibria I construct start from a phase where active learning takes place followed by an
absorbing phase where learning stops. Different from the learning phases in Wiseman (2005, 2012), during
which players experiment and learn about their payoffs, the learning phase in my model is constructed so that
the patient player can extract information rent and can attain strictly higher payoff compared to the complete
information benchmark. As a result, the length of the learning phase in my model increases with the discount
factor, while it does not vary with the discount factor in Wiseman (2005, 2012).
Mixed-Strategy Commitment Types: Mathevet, Pearce and Stacchetti (2019) construct patient-player-optimal
equilibria in a repeated communication game in which the stage-game follows from the leading example of
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). They examine a commitment-type model in which with positive probability,
the sender is committed and sends messages according to her optimal disclosure policy in every period.
A qualitative difference between their equilibrium and mine emerges when the long-run player’s reputation
is low, i.e., after she has cheated too much in the past. In their equilibrium, the normal type sender can still
extract information rent in the future, she never reveals her rationality, and learning about her type does not stop
at low reputations. In my equilibrium, the high-cost type cannot extract information rent anymore in the future,
her private information can be perfectly revealed, and learning about her type stops at low reputations.
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This difference is driven by the distinction between rational reputational type in my model and non-strategic
committed type in theirs. In my rational type model, if player 1 has shirked too much in the past and has a
low reputation, then she cannot be allowed to extract information rent any more in the future. This is because
otherwise, even the lowest-cost type will have a strict incentive to shirk, making it no longer valuable for other
types to build a reputation for being the lowest-cost type, and the reputational equilibrium unravels.
In contrast, the mixed-strategy commitment type in their model faces no incentive constraint, plays a mixed
action in every period. As a consequence, the rational long-run player never fully reveals her type, and can extract
information rent in the future no matter how much she has cheated in the past.
Capital-Theoretic Reputation Models: Reputation cycles also occur in the Poisson good news models of
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) and Dilmé (2018). They characterize Markov equilibria in which the long-run
player exerts effort when her reputation is above some cutoff. Different from my model, reputation jumps up
immediately after the arrival of good news. Moreover, the long-run player’s reputation depends only on the most
recent time of news arrival in their models while it depends on the history of her actions in mine.
These distinctions are caused by the difference sources of learning. In my model, learning arises from the
differences in different types’ behaviors, while in their models, all types adopt the same behavior but face different
news arrival rates. In terms of the applications, my model fits into online platforms where feedback arrives
frequently while their Poisson models fit into markets with infrequent news arrival.
In the bad news model of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) and the Brownian model of Bohren (2018), the
informed player’s effort increases in her reputation. This differs from the active learning phase in the equilibria I
construct where the high-cost types shirk with probability one when her reputation is close to one.
Sustainability of Reputations: Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) study models with commitment types.
They show if the monitoring structure satisfies a full support condition and player 1’s actions are statistically
identified, then in every equilibrium, player 2s eventually learn player 1’s type as t → ∞, and the limiting
equilibrium play converges to an equilibrium of the game where player 1’s type is common knowledge.
In my baseline model, the uninformed players perfectly observe the outcome in each period, which means that
the full support and identification conditions are not satisfied. This leads to qualitative differences in equilibrium
outcomes. For example, player 2s may not learn player 1’s type as t → ∞. Such incomplete learning occurs
in my constructed equilibrium when play reaches a Class 3 history directly from a Class 1 history, after which
learning about player 1’s stops and player 2’s belief attaches strictly positive probability to multiple types.12
12Incomplete learning of player 1’s type does not contradict my previous claim that in all except for a bounded number of periods,
player 2’s prediction about player 1’s future actions is arbitrarily close to player 1’s action under the true state. This can happen when
different types of player 1 use the same equilibrium strategy, in which case player 2s cannot learn player 1’s type by observing player 1’s
actions but can precisely predict player 1’s action in the true state.
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Moreover, my analysis needs to take into account player 1’s payoff and behavior in finite time, as well as the
speed with which player 2s learn. This contrasts to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004)’s results that focus
exclusively on player 2’s belief and the equilibrium play as t →∞. To elaborate, in every equilibrium in which
type θj approximately attains v
∗
j for some j ≥ 2, the expected length of the active learning phase grows without
bound as δ → 1. This is because type θj’s continuation payoff cannot exceed 1 − θj after learning stops, so she
can only obtain payoff strictly higher than 1− θj when active learning about her type takes place. Despite player
1’s continuation value eventually converges to a complete information game payoff as t → ∞, the time it takes
for such convergence to occur is crucial for a patient player 1’s equilibrium payoff.
5 Concluding Remarks
I conclude by discussing the robustness of my results to simultaneous-move stage games, forward-looking buyers,
and imperfect monitoring of the seller’s actions (section 5.1). Then I list some alternative applications of my
model and results (section 5.2). Generalizations beyond 2× 2 trust games are stated in Appendix D.
5.1 Robustness of Results
Simultaneous-Move Stage Game: Consider a simultaneous-move trust game with stage-game payoffs:
- T N
H 1− θ, b −d(θ), 0
L 1,−c 0, 0
where b, c > 0, θ ∈ Θ ≡ {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} ⊂ (0, 1) is player 1’s persistent private information, and d(θ) ≥ 0
measures player 1’s loss when she exerts high effort while player 2 does not trust. In the repeated version of this
game, players’ past action choices are perfectly monitored and the public history ht ≡ {a1,s, a2,s}t−1s=0 consists
of both players’ past action choices. Other features of the game remain the same as in the baseline model.
For the results on equilibrium payoffs, recall the definition of v∗ in (3.1). A construction similar to the one in
section 4 implies that v∗ is approximately attainable when δ is close to 1. Under a supermodularity condition on
the stage-game payoffs:
0 ≤ d(θj)− d(θi) ≤ θj − θi for every j < i, (5.1)
one can show that for every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, v∗j is type θj patient long-run player’s highest equilibrium payoff.13
13In a repeated incomplete information game with all types of player 1 sharing the same ordinal preferences over stage-game outcomes,
the lowest equilibrium payoff is 0. This is because repeating the outcome of (L,N) is always an equilibrium of the repeated game, no
matter whether the stage-game is simultaneous-move or sequential-move.
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Under the supermodularity condition in (5.1), the conclusions in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 extend to the
simultaneous-move stage game. In particular, no type of the long-run player uses a stationary strategy or has a
completely best reply in any equilibrium that approximately attains v∗. For the bounds on the long-run player’s
action frequencies that apply to all of her pure-strategy best replies, one needs to replace yt = H and yt = L in
(3.5) and (3.6) with a1,t = H and a1,t = L, respectively.
Stage Game with Imperfect Monitoring: Player 1 is an agent, for example a worker, a supplier or a private
contractor. In every period, a principal (player 2, for example an employer or a final good producer) is randomly
matched with the agent. The principal then decides whether to incur a fixed cost and interact with the agent or
to skip the interaction. The agent chooses her effort from a closed interval unbeknownst to the principal. The
probability with which the service quality being high increases with her effort. In line with the literature on
incomplete contracts, the service quality is not contractible but is observable to the agent and all the subsequent
principals. The cost of effort is linear and the marginal cost of effort is the agent’s persistent private information.14
Players move sequentially in the stage game. Different from the baseline model, after player 2 chooses to
trust, player 1 chooses among a continuum of effort levels e ∈ [0, 1]. The quality of the output being produced is
denoted by z ∈ {G,B}, which is good (or z = G) with probability e and is bad (or z = B) with complementary
probability. The cost of effort for type θi is θie. Player 1’s benefit from her opponent’s trust is normalized to
1. Therefore, her stage-game payoff under outcome N is 0 and that under outcome (T, e) is 1 − θie. Player 2’s
payoff is 0 if he chooses N . His benefit from good output is b while his loss from bad output is c, with b, c > 0.
Therefore, player 2 is willing to trust only when player 1’s expected effort exceeds γ∗ ≡ c
b+c .
Consider the repeated version of this game in which the public history consists of player 2’s actions and the
realized output quality, i.e., player 1’s effort choice is her private information. In period t, let a1,t be player 1’s
action, let a2,t be player 2’s action, and let zt be the realized output quality. Let h
t = {a2,s, zs}t−1s=0 ∈ Ht be a
public history with H ≡ ⋃+∞t=0 Ht the set of public histories. Let ht1 = {a1,s, a2,s, zs}t−1s=0 ∈ Ht1 be player 1’s
private history with H1 ≡
⋃+∞
t=0 Ht1 the set of private histories. Let σ2 : H → ∆(A2) be player 2’s strategy and
let σθ : H1 → ∆(A1) be type θ player 1’s strategy, with σ1 ≡ (σθ)θ∈Θ.
The above game with a continuum of effort, linear effort cost, and imperfect monitoring is equivalent to the
baseline model with binary effort and perfect monitoring. To see this, choosing effort level e under imperfect
monitoring is equivalent to choosing a mixed action eH + (1 − e)L under perfect monitoring. In terms of the
results on payoffs, one can show that v∗j is type θj’s highest equilibrium payoff when she is patient, and payoff
vector v∗ is approximately attainable when δ is close to 1. In terms of behaviors, the bounds on the relative
14Chassang (2010) studies a game in which players face similar incentives. The main difference is that the agent’s cost of effort is
common knowledge but the set of actions that are available in each period is the agent’s private information. Tirole (1996) uses a similar
model to study the collective reputation of commercial firms and that of bureaucrats.
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frequencies can be applied to realized paths of public signals, namely, one needs to replace yt = H and yt = L
in (3.5) and (3.6) with (a2,t, zt) = (T,G) and (a2,t, zt) = (T,B), respectively.
Forward-Looking Buyer: My results are robust when the seller faces a single buyer whose discount factor
δ2 is strictly positive but close to 0. To begin with, the constructed equilibrium that approximately attains v
∗
remains to be an equilibrium under any δ2. This is because at every off-path history, the buyer plays N and all
types of player 1 play L, in which case the buyer receives his minmax payoff. Hence, the buyer’s strategy in the
constructed equilibrium maximizes his stage-game payoff while it cannot lower his continuation payoff.
The necessity of constraint (3.3) relies on the observation that at every on-path history, the buyer has no
incentive to play T unless he expectsH to be played with positive probability. This remains valid when δ2 < γ
∗.
Suppose toward a contradiction that at some on-path history ht, all types of seller play L for sure, but the buyer
plays T with strictly positive probability. The buyer’s discounted average payoff by playing T at ht is at most:
(1− δ2)(−c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2’s stage-game payoff if he plays T while P1 plays L for sure
+ δ2b︸︷︷︸
P2’s maximal continuation payoff after playing T
.
Since δ2 < γ
∗ ≡ c
b+c , the above expression is strictly less than 0. This contradicts the buyer’s incentive to play
T at ht since he can secure payoff 0 by playing N in every subsequent period.
In addition, when δ2 is close to 0, the buyer has no incentive to play T at h
t unless he expects H to be played
with probability more than γ∗ − ε, with ε vanishes to 0 as δ2 → 0. This implies an approximate version of
constraint (3.4) when the seller’s discount factor δ1 is close enough to 1:
αj(H) ≥ γ
∗ − ε
1− γ∗ + εα
j(L), (5.2)
with
αj(y) ≡ E(σθj ,σ2)[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ1)δt11{yt = y}
]
for every y ∈ {N,H,L}.
Replacing (3.4) with constraint (5.2), the value of the constrained optimization problem is close to v∗j , which
converges to v∗j as δ2 → 0. This implies the robustness of Theorem 1 to perturbations of δ2. Given that the proofs
of Theorems 2 and 3 do not use buyers’ incentive constraints aside from the conclusion that v∗ is a patient seller’s
highest equilibrium payoff, those results are also robust to small perturbations of δ2.
5.2 Alternative Applications
Capital Taxation: Player 1 is a government and player 2s are a sequence of foreign investors. The stage-game
is depicted in Figure 4, where θ ∈ {θ1, ..., θm} is the government’s private information that measures its benefit
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invest not invest
low tax high tax
P2
P1 (0, 0)
(1, b) (1 + θ, −c)
Figure 4: Capital Taxation Game Between Government and Investors
from expropriating investors via high tax rates. I assume that 0 < θ1 < ..., < θm, namely, all types of government
strictly benefit from expropriation. This game can be analyzed using similar techniques as my baseline model.
Let γ∗ ≡ c
b+c . One can show that type θ government’s highest equilibrium payoff v
∗
j is the value of:
max
α∈∆{not invest,high tax,low tax}
{
α(low tax) + (1 + θj)α(high tax)
}
, (5.3)
subject to:
α(low tax) + (1 + θ1)α(high tax) ≤ 1, (5.4)
and
α(low tax) ≥ γ
∗
1− γ∗α(high tax). (5.5)
Solving this problem, one can obtain
v∗j =
1 + θj − γ∗θj
1 + θ1 − γ∗θ1 . (5.6)
Similar to the baseline model, v∗j depends only on θj and the lowest possible temptation to expropriate θ1, but
not on the other aspects of incomplete information. In addition, the lowest benefit type θ1 cannot strictly benefit
from incomplete information, while types θ2 to θm can receive payoff strictly higher than 1. The results on the
government’s on-path behaviors in equilibria that approximately attain v∗ ≡ (v∗1 , ..., v∗m) extend as well.
Entry Deterrence/Limit Pricing Game Player 1 is an incumbent choosing between a low price (or fight) and
a normal price (or accommodate). Player 2 is an entrant deciding whether to enter or not. Players’ payoffs are:
- Out Enter
Low Price 1− θ, 0 −d(θ),−b
Normal Price 1, 0 0, c
where θ and d(θ) are the incumbent’s costs from lowering prices, which is interpreted as limit pricing if the
entrant stays out, and is interpreted as predation if the entrant enters. As argued in Milgrom and Roberts (1982),
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θ depends on the efficiency of the incumbent’s production technology, which tends to be its persistent private
information. This maps into the simultaneous-move version of the stage game once we replace Low Price with
H , Normal Price with L, Out with T , and Enter with N .
Monetary Policy: Player 1 is a central bank, that interacts with a continuum of households (player 2s), each has
negligible mass. In every period, the central bank chooses the inflation level while at the same time, households
form their expectations about inflation. To simplify matters, I assume that both actual inflation and expected
inflation are binary variables. In line with the classic work of Barro (1986), players’ stage game payoffs are:
- Low Expectation High Expectation
Low Inflation 1− θ, x1 −d(θ),−y1
High Inflation 1,−y2 0, x2
where x1, x2, y1, y2 > 0 are parameters, θ ∈ Θ ⊂ (0, 1) is the central bank’s private information. This game
maps into the simultaneous-move version of my stage game.
To interpret these payoffs, households want to match their expectations with the actual inflation. The central
bank’s payoff decreases with the actual inflation and increases with the amount of surprised inflation (defined
as actual inflation minus expected inflation). As argued in Barro (1986), the central bank can strictly benefit
from surprised inflation as it can increase real economic activities, decrease unemployment rate and increase
governmental revenue. How the central bank trades-off these benefits with the costs of inflation is captured
by θ, which depends on the central banker’s ideology and tends to be her persistent private information. The
assumption that θ < 1 implies that inflation is costly for the central bank if it is fully anticipated by households.
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A Proof of Theorem 1: Constructing High-Payoff Equilibria
Defining Constants: Recall the definitions of γ∗, vH , vN , vL, and v(γ). There exists a rational number
n̂/k̂ ∈ (γ∗, γ) with n̂, k̂ ∈ N. Hence, there exists an integer j ∈ N such that
n̂
k̂
=
n̂j
k̂j
<
n̂j
k̂j − 1
< γ.
Let n ≡ n̂j and k ≡ k̂j. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be large enough such that:
δ + δ2 + ...+ δn
δ + δ2 + ...+ δk
< γ˜ <
δk−n−1(δ + δ2 + ...+ δn)
δ + δ2 + ...+ δk−1
. (A.1)
Later on in the proof, I impose two other requirements on δ, given by (A.26). These are compatible with (A.2)
since all of these requirements are satisfied when δ is above some cutoff. Let
γ˜ ≡ 1
2
(n
k
+
n
k − 1
)
and γ̂ ≡ 1
2
(n
k
+ γ∗
)
. (A.2)
By construction, γ∗ < γ̂ < n
k
< γ˜ < n
k−1 < γ. Let πj be the prior probability of type θj . For every j ≥ 3, let
kj ∈ N be large enough such that:
(1− γ∗π1) (πj/kj)∑k
n=2 πn + (πj/kj)
≤ 1− γ∗. (A.3)
LetK ≡∑mj=3 kj . Let η∗ ∈ [γ∗π1, π1) be large enough such that for every η ∈ [η∗, π1], we have:
π1 − η
π1(1− η) ≤ minj∈{3,...,m}
{ πj/kj
π2 + ...+ πj
}
(A.4)
Let λ ∈ (0, 1−
√
γ∗
γ∗
) be small enough such that:
(
1− λγ∗)1−γ̂(1 + λ(1− γ∗))γ̂ > 1. (A.5)
State Variables: The constructed equilibrium keeps track of three state variables:
1. η(ht), which is the probability P2’s belief attaches to type θ1 at h
t.
2. P1’s continuation value at ht, v(ht) ≡ {vj(ht)}mj=1. I show in Appendix A.4.1 that v(ht) can be written as
v(ht) ≡ pL(ht)vL + pH(ht)vH + pN (ht)vN .
3. θ(ht), which is the highest cost type in the support of P2’s belief at ht, and its probability.
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The third state variable is implied by the first one when there are only two types in the support of buyers’ prior
belief. I describe players’ actions and the evolution of P1’s continuation value at on-path histories. At off-path
histories, P2 plays N and every type of P1 plays L. I partition the set of on-path histories into three classes:
• Class 1 Histories: ht is such that pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ.
• Class 2 Histories: ht is such that pL(ht) ∈ (0, 1 − δ).
• Class 3 Histories: ht is such that pL(ht) = 0.
Play starts from a Class 1 history h0 and eventually reaches some Class 3 histories. Class 3 histories are absorbing
in the sense that if pL(ht) = 0, then pL(hs) = 0 for all hs  ht. Active learning about P1’s type happens at
Class 1 and Class 2 histories, but stops after reaching Class 3 histories.
A.1 Class 1 Histories
Players’ Actions: At every ht that satisfies pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ:
• Player 2 plays T for sure.
• Type θ1 plays H with probability:
η(ht)− η(ht, L)
η(ht,H)− η(ht, L) ·
η(ht,H)
η(ht)
, (A.6)
and other types in the support of P2’s belief play H with the same probability, equal to:
η(ht)− η(ht, L)
η(ht,H)− η(ht, L) ·
1− η(ht,H)
1− η(ht) , (A.7)
where the posterior beliefs η(ht,H) and η(ht, L) are functions of η(ht), given by:
η(ht,H) = η∗ +min
{
1− η∗, (1 + λ(1− γ∗))(η(ht)− η∗)}, (A.8)
η(ht, L) = η∗ + (1− λγ∗)(η(ht)− η∗), (A.9)
with η∗ a constant that satisfies (A.4), and λ is a constant that satisfies (A.5).
One can use (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9) to write the probability that each type of player 1 playing H at ht as a
function of η(ht), i.e., P1’s action at Class 1 histories only depends on P2’s belief about her being type θ1.
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P1’s Continuation Value: For every ht that satisfies pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ:
1. If P1 plays L at ht, then his continuation value is:
v(ht, L) =
pN (ht)
δ
vN +
pL(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vL +
pH(ht)
δ
vH . (A.10)
2. If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, P1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is:
v(ht,H) =
pN (ht)
δ
vN +
pL(ht)
δ
vL +
pH(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vH . (A.11)
If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, P1’s continuation value after playing H at ht is:
v(ht,H) =
v1(h
t,H)
1− θ1 v
H +
(
1− v1(h
t,H)
1− θ1
)
vN ∈ Rm, (A.12)
with v1(h
t,H) ≡ v1(h
t)− (1− δ)(1 − θ1)
δ
and v1(h
t) ∈ R is the first entry of v(ht). (A.13)
Players’ Incentives: I verify players’ incentive constraints at Class 1 histories:
1. If pL(ht) ≥ 1 − δ and η(ht,H) < 1, then according to (A.10) and (A.11), all types of P1 are indifferent
between playing H and L at ht.
2. If pL(ht) ≥ 1 − δ and η(ht,H) = 1, then according to (A.10) and (A.12), type θ1 is indifferent between
H and L at ht, and other types in the support of P2’s belief strictly prefer to play L at ht.
3. If P2’s beliefs are updated according to (A.8) and (A.9), thenH is played at ht with probability at least γ∗,
i.e., P2 has an incentive to play T at ht. This is derived in section A.4.
Belief updating formulas (A.8) and (A.9), together with (A.5) lead to the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. For every η ∈ (η∗, 1), there exist T ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1), s.t. when η(hr) ≥ η and δ > δ, if
ht ≡ (y0, ..., yt−1) ≻ hr and all histories between hr and ht belong to Class 1, then:
(1− δ)
t−1∑
s=r
δs−r1{ys = H}︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight of (T,H) played from r to t
≤ (1− δT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight of initial T periods
+(1− δ)
t−1∑
s=r
δs−r1{ys = L}︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight of (T,L) played from r to t
· γ˜
1− γ˜ . (A.14)
The proof is in Appendix A.5. For some intuition, given the belief updating formulas (A.8) and (A.9), player
2’s posterior belief at ht depends only on her belief at hr and the number of timesH and L have been played from
period r to t. Since the choice of λ satisfies the first inequality in (A.5), if player 1 plays H with (undiscounted)
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frequency above γ̂, then player 2’s belief at ht attaches higher probability to type θ1 compared to her belief at h
r.
When P2’s belief at hr attaches probability more than η to type θ1, her posterior attaches probability 1 to type θ1
before period r + S, where:
S ≡
⌈ log 1−η∗
η−η∗
log
{
(1− λγ∗)1−γ̂(1 + λ(1− γ∗))γ̂
}⌉, (A.15)
after which P2’s belief about type θ1 reaches 1, and the convex weight of v
L equals 0 according to (A.12).
The requirement that all histories from hr to ht belonging to Class 1 not only leads to an upper bound on
the undiscounted frequency with which (T,H) being played from r to t, but also imposes constraints on how
frontloaded outcome (T,H) can be. For example, after P1 plays H in the first
T ≡
⌈ log 1
π1
log
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗))
⌉
(A.16)
periods, P2’s belief about type θ1 reaches 1, and the convex weight of v
L equals 0 according to (A.12). If δ is
large enough, then the constraint on undiscounted frequency and the constraint on frontloadedness of outcome
(T,H) lead to an upper bound on the discounted frequency with which outcome (T,H) occurs from r to t, with
γ̂ being replaced by a larger γ˜ to provide extra slack caused by the discount factor δ.
I apply Lemma A.1 by setting hr = h0 and η = η(h0). If ht and all its predecessors belong to Class 1, then:
(1− δ)
t−1∑
s=0
δs1{ys = (T,L)} ≤ pL(h0) = (1− θ1)(1− γ)
1− γθ1 .
Lemma A.1 leads to an upper bound on (1− δ)∑t−1s=0 δs1{ys = (T,H)}, which implies that if δ is large enough,
then
pH(ht) ≥ Y ≡ 1
2
(
γ − (1− γ) γ˜
1− γ˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1− θ1
1− γθ1 , (A.17)
for every ht such that ht and all its predecessors belonging to Class 1.
A.2 Class 2 Histories
Players’ Actions: If ht is such that pL(ht) ∈ (0, 1− δ), then at ht,
1. Player 2 plays T for sure.
2. Types in the support of P2’s belief at ht except for type θ(ht) playH for sure. Type θ(ht) potentially mixes
between H and L, with probabilities specified below.
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Let
l(ht) ≡ #
{
hs
∣∣∣hs ≺ ht, hs belongs to Class 2, and θ(hs) = θ(ht)} (A.18)
be the number of histories that (1) strictly precede ht, and (2) the highest-cost type in the support of P2’s belief
is also θ(ht). Consider two cases separately, depending on whether θ(ht) is θ2 or not.
1. If θ(ht) = θj with j ≥ 3, then type θ(ht) plays L at ht with probability
1
kj − l(ht) , (A.19)
in which kj is the integer defined in (A.3).
2. If θ(ht) = θ2, then type θ(h
t) plays L at ht with probability
min{1, 1− γ
∗
1− η(ht)}. (A.20)
P1’s Continuation Value: After player 1 plays L at ht, P1’s continuation value is
v(ht, L) ≡ Q(h
t)
δ
vH +
δ −Q(ht)
δ
vN , (A.21)
where
Q(ht) ≡ pH(ht)− 1− δ − p
L(ht)
1− θ(ht) (A.22)
After player 1 plays H at ht, his continuation value depends on whether η(ht,H) equals 1 or not, with η(ht,H)
computed via Bayes Rule given P2’s belief at ht and type θ(ht)’s mixing probability at ht:
1. If η(ht,H) < 1, then P1’s continuation payoff at (ht,H), denoted by v(ht,H), is given by (A.11).
2. If η(ht,H) = 1, then P1’s continuation payoff at (ht,H), denoted by v(ht,H), is given by (A.12).
By construction of player 1’s equilibrium actions, it is clear that η(ht,H) = 1 at Class 2 history ht only when
θ(ht) = θ2. This is because when θ(h
t) > θ3, type θ2 plays H at h
t for sure, and η(ht,H) < 1.
Players’ Incentives: Lemma A.2 states that players’ incentive constraints at Class 2 histories are satisfied.
Lemma A.2. At every Class 2 history ht,
1. P2 has an incentive to play T .
2. If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, then type θ(ht) is indifferent between H and L at ht, and types that have
strictly lower cost than θ(ht) strictly prefer to play H at ht.
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3. If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then type θ(ht) strictly prefers to play L at ht, and types that have strictly
lower cost than θ(ht) strictly prefer to play H at ht.
Properties of Class 2 Histories: I state three properties of Class 2 histories, all of which are shown in section
A.4. Lemma A.3 establishes a lower bound on P2’s posterior belief after observing H at any Class 2 history.
Lemma A.3. For any Class 2 history ht.
• If θ(ht) ≥ θ3, then η(ht,H) ≥ η(h0) and η(ht, L) = 0.
• If θ(ht) = θ2, then η(ht,H) = min{1, η(h
t)
γ∗
} and η(ht, L) = 0.
Lemma A.4 establishes an upper bound on the number of Class 2 histories along every path of play.
Lemma A.4. There exist δ ∈ (0, 1) andM ∈ N, such that when δ > δ, the number of Class 2 histories along
every path of equilibrium play is at mostM .
Lemma A.5 establishes a uniform lower bound on pH(ht) for all Class 1 and Class 2 histories.
Lemma A.5. There exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and Q > 0, such that when δ > δ, we have pH(ht) ≥ Q for all ht
belonging to Class 1 and Class 2.
Lemma A.5 also implies a lower bound on pH(ht) if ht is the first history that reaches Class 3, i.e., ht is such
that pL(ht) = 0 and pL(hs) > 0 for all hs ≺ ht.
A.3 Class 3 Histories
If ht is such that pL(ht) = 0, then v(ht) is a convex combination of vH and vN . According to Fudenberg and
Maskin (1991), stated as Lemma 3.7.2 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006, page 99), when δ is large enough, there
exist {vt}∞t=0 with vt ∈ {vN , vH} such that first, v(ht) = (1 − δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
tvt, and second, for every s ∈ N,
(1− δ)∑∞t=s δt−svt is ε−close to v(ht). Players’ continuation play following ht is given by:
• For every s ∈ N such that vs = vH , P2 plays T and all types of P1 play H in period t+ s.
• For every s ∈ N such that vs = vN , P2 plays N and all types of P1 play L in period t+ s.
Players’ Incentives: P2’s incentive at Class 3 histories are trivially satisfied. For P1’s incentives, pick ε in
Lemma 3.7.2 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006) to be small enough. Lemma A.5 implies that P1’s continuation
value at every Class 3 history is no less than (Q/2)vH +
(
1−Q/2
)
vN . When a patient P1 is asked to play H ,
she has a strict incentive to comply since if she does not comply, then her continuation payoff is 0; and if she
complies, then her continuation payoff is strictly bounded away from 0.
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A.4 Incentive Constraints & Promise Keeping Constraints
First, I verify that at every on-path history, P1’s continuation payoff is a convex combination of vN , vH , and vL.
Next, I show that P2 has an incentive to play T at every Class 1 history. Then, I show Lemmas A.2 to A.5, which
together with Lemma A.1 imply the promise keeping condition, that the continuation play delivers every type of
player 1 her promised continuation value at every on-path history.
A.4.1 P1’s Continuation Value
P1’s continuation value in the beginning v(h0) is a convex combination of vN , vH , and vL. I show that:
• Suppose ht is an on-path history and v(ht) is a convex combination of vN , vH , and vL, then for every
outcome yt ∈ {N,H,L} that occurs with positive probability at ht, P1’s continuation value after yt, given
by v(ht, yt), is also a convex combination of v
N , vH , and vL.
First, consider the case in which ht belongs to Class 3. Given that pL(ht) = 0, or equivalently, v(ht) is a convex
combination of vN and vH , the only on-path outcomes at ht are N and (T,H). As a result, the continuation
payoffs v(ht, N) and v(ht,H) are both convex combinations of vN and vH .
Second, consider the case in which ht belongs to Class 1. There are two possible outcomes at ht: (T,H) and
(T,L). If ht is such that η(ht,H) 6= 1, then according to (A.10) and (A.11), P1’s continuation value remains
to be a convex combination of vN , vH , and vL. If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then according to (A.10) and
(A.12), P1’s continuation value remains to be a convex combination of vN , vH , and vL.
Third, consider the case in which ht belongs to Class 2. There are two possible outcomes at ht: (T,H) and
(T,L). If player 1 plays L, then his continuation value is (A.21), which is a convex combination of vN and vH .
If he playsH , then his continuation value is (A.11) if η(ht,H) 6= 1, and is (A.12) if η(ht,H) = 1. In both cases,
v(ht,H) is a convex combination of vN , vL, and vH .
A.4.2 P2’s Incentives at Class 1 Histories
I show thatH is played with probability at least γ∗ at every Class 1 history, which implies that P2 has an incentive
to play T . Let pH(h
t) be the probability that P1 plays H at ht according to P2’s belief. Since P2’s belief is a
martingale, we have:
pH(h
t)η(ht,H) + (1− pH(ht))η(ht, L) = η(ht).
The above equality is equivalent to:
pH(h
t)
(
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
)
+ (1− pH(ht))
(
η(ht, L)− η(ht)
)
= 0
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⇔ pH(ht)
(
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
)
= (1− pH(ht))
(
η(ht)− η(ht, L)
)
.
As long as η(ht, L) 6= η(ht) and pH(ht) 6= 0, i.e., nontrivial learning happens at ht, and H is played at ht with
positive probability, we have:
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
η(ht)− η(ht, L) =
1− pH(ht)
pH(ht)
. (A.23)
If P2 plays T with positive probability at ht, then pH(h
t) ≥ γ∗. This implies that:
η(ht,H)− η(ht)
η(ht)− η(ht, L) =
1− pH(ht)
pH(ht)
≤ 1− γ
∗
γ∗
. (A.24)
The belief updating formulas in (A.8) and (A.9) satisfy (A.25), and therefore, P2 has an incentive to play T .
A.4.3 Proof of Lemma A.2
Let π(ht) ∈ ∆(Θ) be P2’s belief at ht. For every θ ∈ Θ, let π(ht)[θ] be the probability it attaches to type θ. A
useful observation from the constructed strategies is: for every Class 2 history ht, and every θi < θj ,
1. if θj belongs to the support of P2’s belief at h
t, then θi also belongs to the support of that belief.
2. if θ(ht) = θj , then
π(ht)[θj ]
π(ht)[θi]
=
πj
πi
· kj − l(h
t)
kj
.
I start from verifying P2’s incentives using the observation that at every history ht belonging to Class 1 or Class
2,
η(ht) ≥︸︷︷︸
by induction on t
η∗ ≥︸︷︷︸
according to (A.4)
γ∗η(h0).
Suppose θ(ht) = θ2, then only types θ1 and θ2 can occur with positive probability at h
t. Since type θ2 plays L
at ht with probability min{1, 1−γ∗1−η(ht)}, type θ1 plays H for sure, and the probability of type θ1 is η(ht), player 2
believes that L is played at ht with probability at most 1− γ∗. This implies her incentive to play T at ht.
Next, I examine the case in which θ(ht) = θj with j ≥ 3. By definition, types with cost higher than θj occur
with probability 0, and type θ1 occurs with probability at least γ
∗π1. According to player 1’s actions at Class 2
histories specified in section A.2, and using statement 2 in Claim 1, the probability with which L is played at ht
is at most:
(1− γ∗π1) (πj/kj)
π2 + ...+ πj−1 + ((kj − l(ht))πj/kj) ≤ (1− γ
∗π1)
(πj/kj)
π2 + ...+ πj−1 + (πj/kj)
. (A.25)
The RHS is no more than 1 − γ∗ according to the definition of kj in (A.3). To verify P1’s incentives, I consider
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two subcases:
1. If ht is such that η(ht,H) < 1, then (A.11), (A.21) and (A.22) imply that type θ(ht) is indifferent between
H and L at ht, and types that are strictly lower than θ(ht) strictly prefer H to L.
2. If ht is such that η(ht,H) = 1, then given that all types except for type θ(ht) play H with probability 1 at
ht, then we know that θ(ht) = θ2. According to (A.11), (A.21) and (A.22), type θ2 strictly prefers L at h
t,
and type θ1 strictly prefers H at h
t.
A.4.4 Proof of Lemma A.3
Case 1: Consider the case in which θ(ht) ≥ θ3. First, suppose η(ht) ≥ η(h0), then the conclusion of Lemma
A.3 follows since η(ht,H) > η(ht) ≥ η(h0). Second, suppose η(ht) < η(h0), then given the value of l(ht) and
the highest-cost type at ht being θj , the posterior probability of type θ1 is bounded from below by:
η(ht)
η(ht) + (1− η(ht))
π2 + ...+ πj−1 +
kj−l(ht)−1
kj
πj
π2 + ...+ πj−1 +
kj−l(ht)
kj
πj
≥ η(h
t)
η(ht) + (1− η(ht))
π2 + ...+ πj−1 +
kj−1
kj
πj
π2 + ...+ πj−1 + πj
Let
X ≡ 1−
π2 + ...+ πj−1 +
kj−1
kj
πj
π2 + ...+ πj−1 + πj
=
πj
kj(π2 + ...+ πj−1 + πj)
.
The lower bound on posterior belief
η(ht)
η(ht)+(1−η(ht))(1−X) is greater than π1 if and only if:
X ≥ 1− (1− π1)η(h
t)
π1(1− η(ht)) =
π1 − η(ht)
π1(1− η(ht)) .
Given that η(ht) ≥ η∗ at every history ht that belongs to Class 2, the above inequality is implied by (A.4).
Case 2: Consider the case in which θ(ht) = θ2. If η(h
t) ≥ γ∗, then type θ2 plays L with probability
min{1, 1−γ∗1−η(ht)} = 1, which implies that η(ht,H) = 1. If η(ht) < γ∗, then type θ2 plays L with probability
min{1, 1−γ∗1−η(ht)} = 1−γ
∗
1−η(ht) , which implies that η(h
t,H) = η(ht)/γ∗ ≥ γ∗η(h0)/γ∗ = η(h0).
A.4.5 Proof of Lemma A.4
Step 1: If ht belongs to Class 2 and θ(ht) = θj ≥ θ3, then according to (A.19), type θ(ht) plays L with
probability 1 when l(ht) = kj − 1, after which play reaches a Class 3 history. Therefore, along every path of
play, there are at most kj Class 2 histories satisfying θ(h
t) = θj , and there are at most K ≡ k3 + ...+ km Class
2 histories that has θ(ht) ≥ θ3.
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Step 2: Let ht be a Class 2 history with θ(ht) = θ2. Let N ≡ ⌈ 11−γ ⌉, and recall T in Lemma A.1. In addition
to the requirements on δ mentioned earlier, I also require δ to satisfy:
δT+1(1 + δ + ...+ δN ) > N and 2δT+N+2 > 1. (A.26)
These are compatible given that all of them require δ to be sufficiently large.
First, I show that after P1 playsH at ht, it takes at most T +N periods for play to reach a history that belongs
to either Class 2 or Class 3. According to the continuation value at (ht,H), given by (A.11), we have:
pL(ht,H) =
pL(ht)
δ
<
1− δ
δ
. (A.27)
The last inequality comes from ht belonging to Class 2, so that pL(ht) < 1 − δ by definition. According to
Lemma A.1, for every Class 1 history hs such that hs ≻ (ht,H) and all histories between (ht,H) and hs belong
to Class 1,
(1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,H)} ≤ (1− δT ) + (1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,L)} γ˜
1 − γ˜ (A.28)
Moreover, (A.27) and the requirement that all histories between (ht,H) and hs belong to Class 1 imply that
(1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,L)} < 1− δ
δ
. (A.29)
Given that only outcomes (T,L) and (T,H) occur at Class 1 and Class 2 histories:
1− δs−(t+1) = (1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,L)}+ (1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,H)}
≤ (1− δT ) + 1− δ
δ
+
1− δ
δ
γ˜
1− γ˜ ≤ (1− δ
T ) +
1− δ
δ
1
1− γ˜ ≤ (1− δ
T ) +
1− δ
δ
1
1− γ (A.30)
To show that s− (t+ 1) ≤ T +N , suppose toward a contradiction that s− (t+ 1) ≥ T +N + 1, then
(1− δT ) + 1− δ
δ
N ≥ (1− δT ) + 1− δ
δ
1
1− γ ≥ 1− δ
s−(t+1) ≥ 1− δT+N+1,
which yields:
1− δ
δ
N ≥ δT (1− δN+1).
38
Dividing both sides by 1−δ
δ
, we have:
N ≥ δT+1(1 + δ + ...+ δN ),
which contradicts the first inequality of (A.26). The above contradiction implies that s− (t+ 1) ≤ T +N .
Second, I focus on history hs that has the following two features:
1. hs belongs to Class 2,
2. hs  (ht,H) and all histories between (ht,H) and hs, excluding hs, belong to Class 1.
I show that there exists at most one period from (ht,H) to hs such that the stage-game outcome is (T,L).
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exist two or more such periods, then
(1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,L)} ≥ 2(1− δ)δT+N+1.
The last inequality comes from the previous conclusion that s− (t+1) ≤ T +N . This is because hs belongs to
Class 2 and hs−1 belongs to Class 1, and therefore, (s − 1) − (t + 1) ≤ T +N , or equivalently, s− (t + 1) ≤
T +N + 1. According to (A.29),
2(1 − δ)δT+N+1 < (1− δ)
s∑
r=t+1
δr−(t+1)1{yr = (T,L)} < 1− δ
δ
. (A.31)
The above inequality contradicts the second inequality of (A.26) that 2δT+N+2 > 1.
Let ht be the first time play reaches a history that belongs to Class 2 with θ(ht) = θ2. According to Lemma
A.3, η(ht,H) ≥ η∗
γ∗
≥ η(h0) = π1. Let hs be the next history that belongs to Class 2 with hs ≻ (ht,H). Since
we have shown that (T,L) occurs at most once between (ht,H) and hs, we know that
η(hs,H) = min{1, η(h
s)
γ∗
} ≥ min{1, η(h
t,H)
γ∗
(1− λγ∗)}
Therefore, conditional on (hs,H) is not a Class 3 history, player 2’s belief at (hs,H) attaches probability at least:
η(hs,H) ≥ η(ht,H)1 − λγ
∗
γ∗
≥ η(ht,H)
√
1
γ∗
(A.32)
to type θ1, where the last inequality comes from λ ∈ (0, 1−
√
γ∗
γ∗
). Let
M̂ ≡ log(1/π1)
log
√
1
γ∗
+ 1.
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Since η(ht,H) ≥ π1 for the first Class 2 history ht satisfying θ(ht) = θ2, there can be at most M̂ Class 2
histories with θ2 being the highest-cost type along every path of play. This is because otherwise, P2’s posterior
belief attaches probability greater than
π1
( 1√
γ∗
)M̂
> 1
at the M̂ + 1th such history, which leads to a contradiction. Summarizing the conclusions of the two parts, there
exist at mostM ≡ K + M̂ Class 2 histories along every path of equilibrium play.
A.4.6 Proof of Lemma A.5
To start with, consider Class 2 history ht such that no predecessor of ht belongs to Class 2, in another word,
all predecessors of ht belong to Class 1. According to (A.17), pH(ht−1) ≥ Y , which implies that pH(ht) ≥
Y − (1− δ). As a result
Q(ht) = pH(ht)− 1− δ − p
L(ht)
1− θ(ht) ≥ Y − (1− δ)
(
1 +
1
1− θm
)
> 0.
If play remains at Class 1 or Class 2 history after ht, then player 1 must be playing H at ht, after which
pH(ht,H) ≥ pH(ht)− (1− δ) ≥ Y − 2(1− δ) and pL(ht,H) ≤ 1− δ
δ
.
According to Lemma A.3, η(ht,H) ≥ η(h0) = π1. One can then apply Lemma A.1 again, which implies that at
every Class 1 history hs such that only one predecessor of hs belongs to Class 2, we have:
pH(hs) ≥ Z ≡ Y − 2(1 − δ)− 1− δ
δ
γ˜
1− γ˜ − (1− δ
T ),
with T and γ˜ being the same as in the previous step. When δ is large enough, Z ≥ Y/2. One can then show that
for every Class 2 history hs such that there is only one strict predecessor history belongs to Class 2,
Q(hs) = pH(hs)− 1− δ − p
L(hs)
1− θ(hs) ≥ Z − (1− δ)
(
1 +
1
1− θm
)
> 0.
Iteratively apply this process. Since
1. the number of Class 2 histories along every path of play is bounded from above byM (Lemma A.4),
2. for every Class 2 history ht, pL(ht,H) = 1−δ
δ
and η(ht,H) ≥ η(h0),
there exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and Q > 0 such that when δ > δ, pH(ht) ≥ Q for every Class 1 or Class 2 history ht.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma A.1
For every ht, let ∆(ht) ≡ η(ht) − η∗. For every t ∈ N, let NL,t and NH,t be the number of periods in which L
and H are played from period 0 to t− 1, respectively. The proof is done by induction on NL,t.
When NL,t ≤ 2(k − n), then the conclusion holds as NH,t ≥ 2n + X. Moreover, ∆(hT ) reaches 1 − η∗
before period T , after which play reaches a Class 3 history.
Suppose the conclusion holds for when NL,t ≤ N with N ≥ 2(k − n), and suppose toward a contradiction
that there exists hT with T ≥ k +X and NL,T = N + 1, such that every ht  hT belongs to Class 1, but
(1− δ)
T−1∑
t=0
δt1{yt = H} − (1− δX ) > (1− δ)
T−1∑
t=0
δt1{yt = L} · γ˜
1− γ˜ , (A.33)
I obtain a contradiction in three steps.
Step 1: I show that for every s < T ,
(1 − δ)
T−1∑
t=s
δt1{yt = H} ≥ (1− δ)
T−1∑
t=s
δt1{yt = L} γ˜
1− γ˜ . (A.34)
Suppose toward a contradiction that (A.34) fails. Then together with (A.33), we have:
(1− δ)
s−1∑
t=0
δt1{yt = H} − (1− δX) > (1− δ)
s−1∑
t=0
δt1{yt = L} γ˜
1− γ˜ (A.35)
and
(1− δ)
T−1∑
t=s
δt1{yt = L} > 0. (A.36)
According to (A.36), NL,s < NL,T . Since NL,T = N + 1, we have NL,s ≤ N . Applying the induction
hypothesis and (A.35), we know that play reaches a Class 3 history before hs, leading to a contradiction.
Step 2: I show that for every k consecutive periods
{yr, yr+1, ..., yr+k−1} ⊂ hT ,
the number of outcome (T,H) in this sequence is at least n+1. According to (A.34) shown in the previous step,
outcome (T,H) occurs at least n+ 1 times in the last k periods, namely, in the set {yT−k+1, ..., yT }.
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists k consecutive periods in which outcome (T,H) occurs no
more than n times, then the conclusion above that outcome (T,H) occurs at least n + 1 times in the last k
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periods implies that there exists k consecutive periods {yr, ..., yr+k−1} in which (T,H) occurs exactly n times
and (T,L) occurs exactly k − n times. According to (A.2), we have
(1− δ)
r+k−1∑
t=r
δt1{yt = H} < (1− δ)
r+k−1∑
t=r
δt1{yt = L} γ˜
1− γ˜ , (A.37)
but then
∆(hr+k) > ∆(hr+1). (A.38)
Next, let us consider the following new sequence with length T − k:
h˜T−k ≡ {y˜0, y˜1, ..., y˜T−k−1} ≡ {y0, y1, ..., yr−1, yr+k, ..., yT−1}
which is obtained by removing {yr, ..., yr+k−1} from the original sequence and front-loading the subsequent
play {yr+k, ..., yT−1}. The number of (T,L) in this new sequence is at mostN +1− (n− k), which is no more
than N . According to the conclusion in Step 1:
(1− δ)
T−1∑
t=r+k
δt1{yt = H} > (1− δ)
T−1∑
t=r+k
δt1{yt = L} γ˜
1− γ˜ . (A.39)
This together with (A.37) and (A.33) imply that
(1− δ)
T−k−1∑
t=0
δt1{y˜t = H} − (1− δX) > (1− δ)
T−k−1∑
t=0
δt1{y˜t = L} γ˜
1− γ˜ .
According to the induction hypothesis, play will reach a Class 3 history before period T − k if player 1 plays
according to {y˜0, y˜1, ..., y˜T−k−1}.
1. Suppose h˜T−k reaches a Class 3 history before period r, then play will also reach a Class 3 history before
period r according to the original sequence.
2. Suppose h˜T−k reaches a Class 3 history in period s, with s > t, then according to (A.38), we have
∆(h˜s) ≤ ∆(hs+k). This implies that play will reach a Class 3 history in period s + k according to the
original sequence.
This contradicts the hypothesis that play has never reached a Class 3 history before hT .
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Step 3: For every history hT ≡ {y0, y1, ..., yT−1} ∈ {H,L}T and t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, define the operator
Ωt : {H,L}T → {H,L}T as:
Ωt(h
T ) = (y0, ..., yt−2, yt, yt−1, yt+1, ..., yT−1), (A.40)
in another word, swapping the order between yt−1 and yt. Recall the belief updating formula in Class 1 histories
and let
HT,∗ ≡
{
hT
∣∣∣∆(ht) < 1− η∗ for all ht ≺ hT}. (A.41)
If hT ∈ HT,∗, then Ωt(hT ) ∈ HT,∗ unless:
• yt−1 = L, yt = H .
• and,
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗)
)
∆(ht−1) ≥ 1− η∗.
Next, I show that the above situation cannot occur besides in the last k periods. Suppose toward a contradiction
that there exists t ≤ T − k such that hT ∈ HT,∗ but Ωt(hT ) /∈ HT,∗. Based on the conclusion in Step 2, outcome
(T,H) occurs at least n+1 times in the sequence {yt, ..., yt+k−1}. Consider another sequence {yt−1, ..., yt+k−1},
in which outcome (T,H) occurs at least n+1 times and outcome (T,L) occurs at most k−n times. This implies
that:
∆(ht+k) ≥ ∆(ht−1)
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗)
)n+1(
1− λγ∗
)k−n
= ∆(ht−1)
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗)
)n(
1− λγ∗
)k−n
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗)
)
≥ ∆(ht−1)
(
1 + λ(1− γ∗)
)
≥ 1− η∗, (A.42)
where second inequality follows from n/k > γ̂, and the 3rd inequality follows from the hypothesis that Ωt(h
T ) /∈
HT,∗. Inequality (A.42) implies that play reaches the high phase before period t + k ≤ T , contradicting the
hypothesis that hT ∈ HT,∗.
To summarize, for every t ≤ T − k, if hT ∈ HT,∗, then Ωt(hT ) ∈ HT,∗. For every t > T − k, if hT ∈ HT,∗,
then Ωt(h
T ) ∈ HT,∗ unless yt−1 = L and yt = H . Therefore, one can freely front-load outcome (T,H) from
period 0 to T − k − 1 and obtain the following revised sequence:
{H,H, ...H,L, ..., L, yT−k , ..., yT−1}, (A.43)
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which meets the following two requirements. First, the revised sequence (A.43) still belongs to setHT,∗. Second,
the sequence in (A.43) satisfies (A.33).
According to the conclusion in Step 2, the number of outcome (T,L) from period 0 to T − k − 1 cannot
exceed k − n − 1, and the number of outcome (T,L) from period T − k to T − 1 cannot exceed k − n − 1.
This is because otherwise, there exists a sequence of length k that has at most n periods of outcome (T,H),
contradicting the two conditions that the revised sequence in (A.43) must satisfy. Therefore, the total number
of outcome (T,L) in this sequence is at most 2(k − n − 1). This contradicts the induction hypothesis that the
number of outcome (T,L) exceeds 2(k − n).
B Proof of Theorem 1: Necessity of Constraints
In section B.1, I establish the necessity of constraint (3.3). In section B.2, I establish the necessity of constraint
(3.4). In section B.3, I show Lemma 3.1, namely, v∗j is the value of the constrained optimization problem.
B.1 Necessity of Constraint (3.3)
For every strategy profile σ, let Hσ be the set of histories that occur with positive probability under σ. For every
ht ∈ Hσ, let Θσ(ht) ⊂ Θ be the support of player 2’s belief at ht. The necessity of (3.3) is implied by:
Proposition B.1. For every prior belief π, including those that do not have full support, if type θi is the
lowest-cost type in the support of this prior belief, then her equilibrium payoff is no more than 1− θi in all BNEs.
Proof. Rank player 1’s actions according toH ≻ L. Given strategy profile σ and history ht ∈ Hσ, let
aσ1 (h
t) ≡ max
{ ⋃
θ∈Θσ(ht)
supp
(
σθ(h
t)
)}
(B.1)
be the highest action played by player 1 with positive probability at ht. By definition, for every BNE σ and
ht ∈ Hσ, if σ2(ht) assigns positive probability to T , then aσ1 (ht) = H . The rest of my proof is done by induction
on the number of types in the support of player 2’s prior belief.
1. I establish the conclusion when |Θσ(h0)| = 1.
2. Suppose the conclusion holds when |Θσ(h0)| ≤ n, it also holds when |Θσ(h0)| = n+ 1.
Step 1: I show that when |Θσ(h0)| = 1, the only type in the support of player 2’s prior belief, denoted by θi,
receives payoff no more than 1 − θi. This also implies that for every equilibrium σ and for every ht ∈ Hσ, if
Θσ(ht) = {θi} for some θi ∈ Θ, then type θi’s continuation payoff at ht cannot exceed 1− θi.
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This is because Θσ(h0) = {θi} implies that Θσ(ht) = {θi} for every ht ∈ Hσ. Therefore, aσ1 (ht) is played
by type θi with positive probability at every h
t ∈ Hσ. Given type θi’s equilibrium strategy σθi , the following
strategy σ˜θi : H → ∆(A1), defined as:
σ˜θi(h
t) ≡

 a
σ
1 (h
t) if ht ∈ Hσ
σθi(h
t) otherwise.
(B.2)
also best replies against player 2’s equilibrium strategy σ2, from which type θi receives his equilibrium payoff.
If type θi plays according to σ˜θi against σ2, then according to Step 1, the outcome at every history in Hσ is
either (T,H) or N . Therefore, type θi’s stage-game payoff at every history in Hσ cannot exceed 1 − θi, so his
discounted average payoff cannot exceed 1− θi.
Step 2: I show that if the conclusion holds when |Θσ(h0)| ≤ n, then it also holds when |Θσ(h0)| = n + 1. I
define Hσt for every t ∈ N recursively. LetHσ0 ≡ {h0}. Given the definition of Hσt , let
Hσt+1 ≡
{
ht+1 ∈ Hσ
∣∣∣∃ht ∈ Hσt s.t. ht+1 ≻ ht and either ht+1 = (ht, N) or ht+1 = (ht, (T, aσ1 (ht)))}.
Intuitively, Hσt+1 is the set of period t + 1 on-path histories such that player 1 has played his highest on-path
action from period 0 to t. LetHσ ≡ ∪∞t=0H
σ
t .
Recall that θi is the notation for the lowest-cost type in the support of player 2’s prior belief. Given type θi’s
equilibrium strategy σθi , let σ̂θi : H → ∆(A1) be defined as:
σ̂θi(h
t) ≡

 a
σ
1 (h
t) if ht ∈ Hσ and aσ1 (ht) ∈ supp
(
σθi(h
t)
)
σθi(h
t) otherwise.
(B.3)
By construction, σ̂θi is type θi’s best reply against σ2. LetH(σ̂θi ,σ2) be the set of histories that occur with positive
probability under (σ̂θi , σ2). Let
Hσ,θi ≡
{
ht ∈ Hσ
∣∣∣θi ∈ Θσ(ht) and aσ1 (ht) /∈ supp(σθi(ht))}. (B.4)
Intuitively, ht ∈ Hσ,θi if and only if
1. At every hs ≺ ht, type θi’s equilibrium strategy σθi plays aσ1 (hs) with positive probability. This comes
from ht ∈ Hσ and θi ∈ Θσ(ht).
2. At ht, type θi plays a
σ
1 (h
t) with zero probability. This comes from aσ1 (h
t) /∈ supp(σθi(ht)).
Consider type θi’s payoff if he plays σ̂θi and player 2 plays σ2. For any given h
t ∈ H(σ̂θi ,σ2),
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1. If there does not exist hs  ht such that hs ∈ Hσ,θi , then type θi’s stage-game payoff at ht and at all
histories preceding ht is no more than 1− θi.
2. If there exists hs  ht such that hs ∈ Hσ,θi , then I show below that type θi’s continuation payoff at hs is
no more than 1− θi.
First, since hs ∈ Hσ,θi , after player 2 observes aσ1 (hs) at hs, θi is no longer in the support of player 2’s
posterior belief. Therefore, for every hs+1 ≻ hs with aσ1 (hs) being played at hs, there exist at most n types
in the support of player 2’s posterior belief at hs+1.
Let θj be the lowest-cost type in the support of P2’s belief at h
s+1. According to the induction hypothesis,
type θj’s continuation payoff after playing a
σ
1 (h
s) at hs is no more than 1 − θj . Type θj’s stage-game
payoff by playing aσ1 (h
s) at hs is also no more than 1− θj . This implies that his continuation payoff at hs
is at most 1− θj .
Therefore, type θj’s continuation payoff by deviating to σ̂θi starting from h
s is no more than 1− θj . Since
θi < θj , and the maximal difference between type θi and θj’s stage-game payoff is θj − θi, we know that
type θi’s continuation payoff at h
s by playing σ̂θi is no more than 1− θi.
The two parts together imply that when |Θσ(h0)| = n+ 1.
1. type θi’s stage-game payoff before reaching any history that belong toHσ,θi is no more than 1− θi,
2. type θi’s continuation payoff at any history belonging to Hσ,θi is no more than 1− θi.
Therefore, θi’s discounted average payoff in period 0 is no more than 1− θi.
B.2 Necessity of Constraint (3.4)
Suppose toward a contradiction that (v1, ..., vm) is an equilibrium payoff and there exists j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such
that vj > vj(γ
∗). Then given the constraint established in the first part that v1 ≤ 1 − θ1, we know that j > 1.
Under the probability measure over H induced by (σθj , σ2), let X(σθj ,σ2) be the occupation measure of outcome
(T,H) and let Y
(σθj ,σ2) be the occupation measure of outcome (T,L). Since vj > vj(γ
∗), we have:
X
(σθj ,σ2)
Y
(σθj ,σ2)
<
γ∗
1− γ∗ . (B.5)
Let the value of the left-hand-side be γ1−γ for some γ ∈ [0, γ∗).
For every hτ ∈ H, let σθj(hτ ) ∈ ∆(A1) be the (mixed) action prescribed by σθj at hτ and let α1(·|hτ ) be
player 2’s expected action of player 1’s at hτ . Let d(·‖·) be the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two action
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distributions. Suppose player 1 plays according to σθj , the result in Gossner (2011) implies that:
E
(σθj ,σ2)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(σθj (h
τ )||α1(·|hτ ))
]
≤ − log π0(θj). (B.6)
This implies that for every ǫ > 0, the expected number of periods such that d(σθj (h
τ )||α1(·|hτ )) > ǫ is no more
than
T (ǫ) ≡
⌈− log π0(θj)
ǫ
⌉
. (B.7)
Let
ǫ ≡ d
(γ + 2γ∗
3
H + (1− γ + 2γ
∗
3
)L
∥∥∥γ∗H + (1− γ∗)L), (B.8)
and let δ be large enough such that:
X
(σθj ,σ2)
Y
(σθj ,σ2) − (1− δT (ǫ))
<
2γ + γ∗
3− 2γ − γ∗ . (B.9)
According to (B.6) and (B.7), if type θj plays according to her equilibrium strategy, then there are at most T (ǫ)
periods in which player 2’s expectation over player 1’s action differs from σθj by more than ǫ. According to
(B.8), aside from T (ǫ) periods, player 2 will trust player 1 at ht only when σθj (h
t) assigns probability at least
γ+2γ∗
3 to H . Therefore, under the probability measure induced by (σθj , σ2), the occupation measure with which
player 2 trusts player 1 is at most:
(1− δT (ǫ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
periods in which player 2’s prediction is wrong
+
(
X
(σθj ,σ2) + Y
(σθj ,σ2) − (1− δT (ǫ))
)2γ + γ∗
γ + 2γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
maximal frequency with which player 2 trusts after he learns
, (B.10)
which is strictly less than X
(σθj ,σ2) + Y
(σθj ,σ2) when δ is close enough to 1. This leads to a contradiction.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Constraint (3.4) implies that:
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L) ≤ (1− θ1)α(H) + 1− γ
∗
γ∗
α(H) = (
1
γ∗
− θ1)α(H),
or equivalently,
α(H) ≥ γ
∗
1− γ∗θ1
(
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L)
)
.
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Recall that θ1 is the lowest-cost type. The objective function (3.2) can be rewritten as:
(1− θj)α(H) + α(L) = (1− θ1)α(H) + α(L)− (θj − θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
α(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ γ∗
1−γ∗θ1
(
(1−θ1)α(H)+α(L)
)
≤
(
1− (θj − θ1) γ
∗
1− γ∗θ1
)(
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L)
)
=
1− γ∗θj
1− γ∗θ1
(
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L)
)
.
According to constraint (3.3) that (1 − θ1)α(H) + α(L) ≤ 1 − θ1, we have the following upper bound of the
objective function (3.2):
(1− θj)α(H) + α(L) ≤ 1− γ
∗θj
1− γ∗θ1
(
(1− θ1)α(H) + α(L)
)
≤ (1− γ∗θj) 1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 = v
∗
j .
The above upper bound is attained by the following distribution over action profiles:
α(H) =
(1 − θ1)γ∗
1− γ∗θ1 , α(L) =
(1− θ1)(1− γ∗)
1− γ∗θ1 , and α(N) =
θ1(1− γ∗)
1− γ∗θ1 ,
which satisfies constraints (3.3) and (3.4). Therefore, the value of the optimization problem is v∗j .
C Results on Equilibrium Behavior
In section C.1, I show Theorem 3. In section C.2, I allow player 1 to have arbitrary payoff functions, and show
that in any equilibrium in which a normal type approximately attains his Stackelberg payoff, any payoff type who
plays the Stackelberg action in every period has to be indifferent between all outcomes in the one-shot game.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
For the first statement, suppose there exists type θi 6= θm and a pure strategy σ̂θi that is type θi’s best reply to σ2,
such that
E
(σ̂θi ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E
(σ̂θi ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] = γi
1− γi (C.1)
for some γi < γ
∗. Let pi be the discounted average frequency with which player 2 plays T under (σ̂θi , σ2).
Let σ̂θm be an arbitrary pure-strategy best reply of type θm against σ2. Let pm be the discounted average
frequency with which player 2 plays T under (σ̂θm , σ2) and let γm be pinned down via:
E
(σ̂θm ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σ̂θm ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] = γm
1− γm . (C.2)
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The long-run player’s ex ante incentive constraints, namely, first, type θi prefers σ̂θi to σ̂θm , and second, type θm
prefers σ̂θm to σ̂θi imply that pi ≥ pm and γi ≥ γm. This further implies that according to type θm’s equilibrium
strategy σθm ,
E
(σθm ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σθm ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ≤ γi
1− γi ,
or equivalently,
γiE
(σθm ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
]
− (1− γi)E(σθm ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
> 0. (C.3)
Since type θm’s payoff from σθm is at least v
∗
m− ε, which is strictly greater than 1− θm when ε is small enough.
This places a lower bound on pm. If type θm plays according to σθm , then the learning arguments in Fudenberg
and Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011) imply that for every ε > 0, there exists δ such that when δ > δ,
γ∗E(σθm ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
]
− (1− γ∗)E(σθm ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
< ε. (C.4)
This contradicts (C.3) once we pick ε to be small enough, which establishes the lower bound on the relative
frequencies of actions.
For the second statement, suppose towards a contradiction that according to one of type θ (6= θ1)’s pure-strategy
best reply to σ2, denoted by σ̂θ,
E
(σ̂θ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] = γ
1− γ (C.5)
where γ > γ∗. Let
p ≡ E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
+ E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
]
.
If type θ1 plays according to σ̂θ, her payoff is p(1− γθ1). According to Theorem 1,
p(1− γθ1) ≤ 1− θ1. (C.6)
If type θ plays according to σ̂θ, she receives her equilibrium payoff, which is p(1− γθ). The equilibrium payoff
is within ε of v∗ implies that:
p(1− γθ) ≥ 1− θ1
1− γ∗θ1 (1− γ
∗θ)− ε. (C.7)
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(z(θ), 0)
(x(θ), b) (y(θ), −c)
Figure 5: Generalized Stage Game
Inequalities (C.6) and (C.7) together imply that:
ε > (1− θ1)
{ 1− γ∗θ
1− γ∗θ1 −
1− γθ
1− γθ1
}
. (C.8)
The RHS is strictly positive since γ > γ∗ and θ > θ1. As a result, inequality (C.8) cannot hold for ε smaller than
the RHS. For every γ > γ∗, take ε to be smaller than
min
θ 6=θ1
(1− θ1)
{ 1− γ∗θ
1− γ∗θ1 −
1− γθ
1− γθ1
}
,
we obtain a contradiction. This establishes the upper bound on the relative frequencies.
C.2 Payoff Types who Behave Like Stackelberg Commitment Type
I explore when can a rational-type patient player mixes between H and L at every history in the trust game, i.e.,
behaves like the Stackelberg commitment type in canonical reputation models. Players’ stage-game payoffs are
shown in Figure 5. Player 1’s stage-game payoff is a function of her type θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is finite. Different
from the baseline model which requires all types of player 1 sharing the same ordinal preferences over stage-game
outcomes, the current setup allows for arbitrary preferences for player 1, and only requires one type of player 1
having the ordinal preference in the baseline model, which I call the normal type.
Proposition C.1. Suppose there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, such that y(θ∗) > x(θ∗) > z(θ∗). For every small enough
ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that when δ > δ, if there exists BNE such that:
• type θ∗ attains within ε of her Stackelberg payoff,
• there exists θ′ ∈ Θ such that type θ′ mixes between H and L at every history,
then it must be the case that x(θ′) = y(θ′) = z(θ′).
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Proof. Suppose there exists such an equilibrium σ. For every ε > 0, there exists δ such that when δ > δ, such
that
E
(σθ∗ ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = H}
]
E(σθ∗ ,σ2)
[∑∞
t=0(1− δ)δt1{yt = L}
] ≥ γ∗ − ε
1− γ∗ + ε. (C.9)
Since type θ∗’s payoff is within ε of her Stackelberg payoff γ∗x(θ∗) + (1− γ∗)y(θ∗), we have:
E
(σθ∗ ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{yt = N}
]
≤ 1 + y(θ
∗)− x(θ∗)
(1− γ∗ + ε)y(θ∗) + (γ∗ − ε)x(θ∗)− z(θ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C
ε. (C.10)
For type θ′ to mix at every history, she is indifferent between σθ∗ , the strategy of playing H at every history,
denoted by σH , and the strategy of playing L at every history, denoted by σL. Inequality (C.10) implies that
unless x(θ′) = y(θ′), type θ′ receives equilibrium payoff strictly between x(θ′) and y(θ′). If type θ′ plays σH ,
then her payoff is between x(θ′) and z(θ′). If type θ′ plays σL, then her payoff is between y(θ′) and z(θ′), and it
cannot be equal y(θ′). These three payoffs coincide, which I denote by Π(θ′). I consider two cases separately.
First, suppose x(θ′) = y(θ′) 6= z(θ′). Then Π(θ′) is a convex combination of y(θ′) and z(θ′), with the
convex weight on z(θ′) being less than the RHS of (C.10). Type θ′ being indifferent between σθ∗ and σL implies
that type θ∗’s payoff by playing σL is at least:
(1− Cε)y(θ∗) + Cεz(θ∗),
which is strictly greater than his Stackelberg payoff when ε is small enough. This implies that type θ∗ has a strict
incentive to deviate to σL, which leads to a contradiction.
Next, suppose x(θ′) 6= y(θ′). Consider three subcases. First, if z(θ′) ≥ max{y(θ′), x(θ′)}, then any convex
combination between z(θ′) and the larger one among x(θ′) and y(θ′) is strictly larger than a number strictly
between x(θ′) and y(θ′). This leads to a contradiction. Similarly, if z(θ′) ≤ min{y(θ′), x(θ′)}, then any convex
combination between z(θ′) and the smaller one among x(θ′) and y(θ′) is strictly smaller than a number strictly
between x(θ′) and y(θ′). This leads to a contradiction. Third, if z(θ′) is strictly between x(θ′) and y(θ′). Then
for a convex combination between z(θ′) and x(θ′) to equal a convex combination between z(θ′) and y(θ′),
both of which attach convex weight 1 to z(θ′), i.e., unless player 1 has played different actions in the past,
otherwise, player 2 never plays T . On the other hand, if player 1 plays according to σθ∗ , then the discounted
average frequency of outcome N is close to 0. Hence, there exists ht that occurs with positive probability under
(σθ∗ , σ2), such that T is played with positive probability under h
t but not at any predecessor of ht. This leads to
a contradiction since by using strategy σH , player 1 can also reach history h
t, which implies that the discounted
average frequency of N under (σH , σ2) is strictly smaller than 1.
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D Generalizations & Robustness
I state generalizations of Theorems 1 and 2 to a class of games. I setup the model and state Theorems 1’ and
2’ when players move simultaneously in the stage game. Analogous results also hold in sequential-move stage
games. Due to length restrictions, the proofs of Theorems 1’ and 2’ are available upon request.
Consider a repeated game in discrete time between an informed player 1 with discount factor δ1 ∈ (0, 1), and
an uninformed player 2 with discount factor δ2 ∈ [0, 1).
• Player 1 has a perfectly persistent type θ ∈ Θ. Player 2’s full support prior is π ∈ ∆(Θ).
• Player 1’s action a1 ∈ A1, player 2’s action a2 ∈ A2. A pure action profile is a ∈ A ≡ A1 × A2, and
player 1’s mixed action is denoted by α1 ∈ ∆(A1).
• Players’ stage game payoffs are u1(θ, a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2), i.e., values are private.
• Player 2’s stage-game best reply to α1 ∈ ∆(A1) is BR2(α1), which is a nonempty subset of A2.
• For every θ ∈ Θ, the set of type θ’s pure Stackelberg action is argmaxa1∈A1 mina2∈BR2(a1) u1(θ, a1, a2).
• Players’ pure actions are perfectly monitored. Players cannot observe each other’s mixed actions.
• I assume that Θ and A1 are finite sets, and |A2| = 2.
I start from Assumption 1 that is satisfied for generic u1 and u2:
Assumption 1. Players’ stage-game payoff functions u1 and u2 satisfy:
1. For every pure action a1 ∈ A1, BR2(a1) is a singleton.
2. For every θ ∈ Θ, type θ has a unique pure Stackelberg action.
Assumption 2 is calledmonotone-supermodularity (MSM), which captures the lack-of-commitment problem.
Assumption 2 (MSM). Θ and A2 are fully ordered sets, and A1 is a lattice, such that:
1. u1(θ, a1, a2) is strictly decreasing in a1, and is strictly increasing in a2.
2. u1(θ, a1, a2) has strictly increasing differences in θ and a1,
u1(θ, a1, a2) has weakly increasing differences in θ and a2.
3. u2(a1, a2) has strictly increasing differences in a1 and a2.
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To map Assumption 2 into the seller-buyer application, let a1 be the quality of good the seller supplies, a2
represents whether the buyer makes the purchase or not, or whether she purchases the customized or standardized
version, and θ measures the efficiency of the seller’s production technology. Assumption 2 requires that:
1. supply high quality is strictly costly for the seller, but he strictly benefits from buyers’ trusting action;
2. a higher type faces lower cost to supply high quality, and values buyers’ trust weakly more;
3. a buyer has stronger incentive to trust when her expectation of product quality is higher.
That being said, my general framework allows the seller to have
1. any finite number of rational types,
2. any finite number of actions, and the seller’s effort can be multi-dimensional.
My framework surpasses the generality of Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Phelan (2006), Ekmekci (2011), Liu
(2011), and Jehiel and Samuelson (2012) that focus on 2× 2 stage-games with player 1 having only one rational
type. It also allows for non-separability between θ and a2, and between a1 and a2 in seller’s payoff, i.e., my
framework can accommodate, but is not limited to the case in which player 1’s benefit from player 2s’ trust being
independent of her type and her action.
Let Θ ≡ {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} with θ1 ≻ θ2 ≻ ... ≻ θm. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let ai ≡ maxAi and ai ≡ minAi. Under
Assumption 2, (a1, a2) is all types of player 1’s minmax outcome.
Let a∗1(θ) ∈ A1 be type θ’s pure Stackelberg action, namely, her optimal commitment if she can only commit
to pure actions. This is uniquely defined under the second statement of Assumption 1. I assume that the most
efficient type of seller finds it optimal to commit to supply the highest quality.
Assumption 3. a∗1(θ1) = a1.
Assumption 3 allows some types of the seller to be inefficient, i.e, their cost of supplying high quality is so
high that they strictly prefer the minmax outcome (a1, a2) to the highest outcome (a1, a2).
I generalize Theorem 1 by characterizing every type of P1’s highest equilibrium payoff when δ1 is close to 1
and δ2 is close to or equal to 0. For every j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, let v∗j be the value of the following problem:
max
α∈∆(A1×A2)
∑
a∈A
α(a)u1(θj, a) (D.1)
subject to: ∑
a∈A
α(a)u1(θ1, a) ≤ u1(θ1, a1, a2), (D.2)
53
and for every a∗2 ∈ A2 such that the marginal distribution of α on A2 attaches positive probability to a∗2,
a∗2 ∈ arg max
a2∈A2
∑
a1∈A1
α1(a1|a∗2)u2(a1, a2), (D.3)
with α1(·|a∗2) ∈ ∆(A1) the distribution over player 1’s actions conditional on a∗2 induced by joint distribution α.
Theorem 1’. If players’ stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, then for every ε > 0, there exist
δ1 ∈ (0, 1) and δ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ1 ∈ (δ1, 1) and δ2 ∈ [0, δ2),
1. There exists no BNE in which type θ1’s payoff is strictly more than v
∗
1. There exists no BNE in which type
θj’s payoff is strictly more than v
∗
j + ε for some j ∈ {2, 3, ...,m}.
2. There exists sequential equilibrium in which P1 attains payoff within ε of v∗ ≡ (v∗1 , ...v∗m).
The proof uses similar ideas as that of Theorem 1, and is available upon request. According to Theorem
1’, v∗j is type θj’s highest equilibrium payoff. Similar to the baseline model, the most efficient type θ1 cannot
strictly benefit from incomplete information and her maximal payoff in the repeated incomplete information
game coincides with her highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete information game. Second, all
types except for type θ1 can strictly benefit from incomplete information. Moreover, every type’s highest
equilibrium payoff depends only on their own type and the most efficient type in the support of player 2s’ prior
belief. Third, v∗j is pinned down by two constraints, which generalize constraints (3.3) and (3.4) in the baseline
model. Constraint (D.2) says that the most efficient type of P1 receives payoff no more than u1(θ1, a1, a2)
under the distribution over stage-game outcome induced by type θj . Similar to the baseline model, this arises
due to type θ1’s incentive constraint and that he cannot benefit from private information. This constraint is
absent in commitment-type models as commitment types face no incentive constraint. Constraint (D.3) says that
conditional on every a2 that occurs with positive probability under α, P2 has an incentive to play a2 against the
conditional distribution over player 1’s actions. This comes from P2’s learning, namely, her prediction about P1’s
action is arbitrarily close to P1’s action in the true state in all except for a bounded number of periods.
Let Θ∗ be the set of types whose mixed Stackelberg payoffs are strictly greater than their minmax payoffs:
Θ∗ ≡
{
θ
∣∣∣ there exist α1 ∈ ∆(A1) and a2 ∈ BR2(α1) such that u1(θ, α1, a2) > u1(θ, a1, a2)}, (D.4)
Given σ2 : H → ∆(A2), I say that σθ : H → ∆(A1) is stationary with respect to σ2 if it takes the same value
for every ht that occurs with positive probability under (σθ, σ2). I say that σθ : H → ∆(A1) is completely mixed
with respect to σ2 if σθ(h
t) has full support for every ht that occurs with positive probability under (σθ, σ2).
Theorem 2’. If |Θ∗| ≥ 2 and stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, then for every small
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enough ε > 0, there exist δ1 ∈ (0, 1) and δ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ1 ∈ (δ1, 1) and δ2 < [0, δ2), in any BNE
σ ≡ ((σθ)θ∈Θ, σ2) that attains payoff within ε of v∗:
1. for every θ ∈ Θ∗ and every σ̂θ that is type θ’s best reply against σ2, σ̂θ is not completely mixed.
2. for every θ ∈ Θ∗, σθ is not stationary.
Similar to that of Theorem 2, the proof of Theorem 2’ uses the following ideas. First, for any given type of
player 1, she cannot strictly benefit from incomplete information after she becomes the most efficient type in the
support of player 2’s posterior belief. Second, if stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular (Assumption
2) and player 2’s stage-game action choice is binary, then in every BNE of this repeated signaling game:
• if a less efficient type finds it weakly optimal to play his highest action a1 in every period, then a more
efficient type plays a1 with probability 1 at every on-path history.
• if a more efficient type finds it weakly optimal to play his lowest action a1 in every period, then a less
efficient type plays a1 with probability 1 at every on-path history.
In general, this step uses a result on 1-shot signaling games developed in Liu and Pei (2020), that provides
sufficient conditions on the sender’s and the receiver’s payoff functions, under which the sender’s action is
non-decreasing with respect to her type in all equilibria.
Next, I use the following learning argument in Gossner (2011). Suppose θ is player 1’s true type and σθ :
H → ∆(A1) is type θ’s equilibrium strategy, the expected number of periods in which player 2s fail to play an
ε-stage-game best reply against σθ(h
t) is uniformly bounded from above. When δ → 1, type θ’s payoff from
playing her equilibrium strategy cannot exceed her payoff from pre-committing to strategy σθ.
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